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INTRODUCTION
The European Insolvency Regulation1 aims to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects
within the European Union. For that purpose, the Insolvency Regulation
lays down rules on jurisdiction common to all member states of the
European Union (Member States), rules to facilitate recognition of
insolvency judgments, and rules regarding the applicable law. The model of
the Regulation will be known. It allows for one main proceeding, opened in
one Member State, with the possibility of opening secondary proceedings in
other EU Member States. The procedural model can only be successful if
these proceedings are coordinated:
Main insolvency proceedings and secondary proceedings can…contribute
to the effective realization of the total assets only if all the concurrent
proceedings pending are coordinated. The main condition here is that the
various liquidators must cooperate closely, in particular by exchanging a
sufficient amount of information. In order to ensure the dominant role of
the main insolvency proceedings, the liquidator in such proceedings
should be given several possibilities for intervening in secondary
insolvency proceedings which are pending at the same time. For example,
he should be able to propose a restructuring plan or composition or apply
for realisation of the assets in the secondary insolvency proceedings to be
suspended.2
In this article, I will analyze a proposal that is included in the
amendments to the EU Insolvency Regulation (InsReg). These amendments
have been made by the European Commission on December 12, 2012. The
* International legal advisor, Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Emeritus professor of
International Insolvency Law, University of Leiden, Leiden Law School, The Netherlands. The
author can be reached via info@bobwessels.nl
1. See generally European Union Insolvency Regulation, Council Regulation 2000/1346,
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation]. It applies to 27 EU Member
States, with the exception of Denmark.
2. Id. recital 20 (emphasis added).
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proposal provides that the liquidator, appointed in the main insolvency
proceedings,
. . . may also give the undertaking that the distribution and priority rights
which local creditors would have had if secondary proceedings had been
opened will be respected in the main proceedings. Such an undertaking
shall be subject to the form requirements, if any, of the State of the
opening of the main proceedings and shall be enforceable and binding on
the estate.3
In Part I, I will first discuss the powers that a liquidator, appointed in
main insolvency proceedings has, including their effects outside the
Member State, the court of which has appointed the liquidator. 4 Thereafter,
attention will be given to InsReg Articles 31(1) and (2) which reflect the
fundamental foundation of the Insolvency Regulation, i.e. the coordination
of main insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency proceeding in
which the liquidator in the main proceedings and the liquidators in the
secondary proceedings shall be duty bound to communicate information to
each other and to cooperate with each other. On the other hand, InsReg
Article 31(3) is a reflection of the dominant role of the main proceedings:
the liquidator in the secondary proceedings shall give the liquidator in the
main proceedings an early opportunity of submitting proposals on the
liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings. 5 Then, in Part
II, I will highlight some of the provisions in Chapter III of the Regulation
(Secondary Insolvency Proceedings) to illustrate the nature and function of
secondary insolvency proceedings with a focus on the coordination of main
insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency proceedings, as well as to
clarify aspects of the so-called “‘dominant”‘ role of the main insolvency
proceedings. In the following section, I provide a short overview of cross-
border insolvency practice in Europe, which serves as the cradle on the
European Commission’s proposal regarding the “as if” undertaking, given
by a main liquidator. After stating the Court of Justice of the European
Union’s view on the question of how to combine and align main and
secondary proceedings which have different or even contrasting aims in
Part IV, I turn in Part V to the European Commission’s proposals of
December 2012 and in Part VI to the amendments suggested by the
European Parliament (EP), the text of which was approved on February 5,
3. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 On Insolvency Proceedings, para. 28(a)(1), COM (2012)
744 final (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation].
4. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(b) provides as a definition for liquidator,
“… any person or body whose function is to administer or liquidate assets of which the debtor has
been divested or to supervise the administration of his affairs. Those persons and bodies are listed
in Annex C”. Annex C lists around 100 national names of these “liquidators”.
5. See Margreet de Boer and Bob Wessels, The Dominance of Main Insolvency Proceedings
under the European Insolvency Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: THEMES AND
PERSPECTIVES 185 (Paul Omar ed., 2008).
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2014. I will then offer for debate in Part VII some critical observations to
the constituent (or lacking) elements of an “as if” undertaking, and in Part
VIII, some queries about the law applicable in such “as if” undertakings.
I. DOMESTIC POWERS OF THE LIQUIDATOR IN MAIN
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
InsReg Article 18 acknowledges the general authority of the main
liquidator to exercise his powers in other Member States.6 InsReg Article 19
comprises a rule relating to the proof of his appointment.7 In principle the
liquidator, appointed by a court that has jurisdiction pursuant to InsReg
Article 3(1) to open main insolvency proceedings, has the authority to
exercise all the powers conferred on him by the lex concursus in the other
Member States. Recognition of main proceedings under InsReg Article 16
takes place “automatically,” and includes recognition of the liquidator
appointed in such proceedings. 8 His powers shall be recognized
“automatically” too in all Member States.9 In these states the liquidator may
exercise the powers conferred to him by the lex concursus, the law of the
State in which main proceedings have been opened.10 The liquidator can
exercise his powers abroad (within the area of the 27 Member States) in
principle without any prior or further formality, especially without having
to obtain an exequatur, without having to propose a form of bail and,
furthermore, without the need to ensure publication of his appointment in
one or more other Member States.
The number of powers that a liquidator in the main insolvency
proceedings may have and the nature of such powers and their legal effects
are all determined by the lex concursus. Furthermore, the lex concursus is
decisive with regard to the liquidator’s legal tasks, duties, the scope of his
power, and the grounds and procedure for his removal. Therefore, for
instance, in Dutch main insolvency proceedings, the appointed liquidator
will also be subject to supervision by the supervisory judge (rechter-
commissaris) when taking steps in other Member States. The Spanish
professors Virgós and Garcimartín submit that the lex concursus will also
be decisive in determining the liquidator’s liability for failure or weakness
of performance, including the standard of care required.11 I submit that the
possibility cannot be excluded that certain (third) parties could start liability
6. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18.
7. Id. art. 19.
8. Id. art. 16.
9. Id.
10. I agree with the proposition of Berends A.J., Grensoverschrijdende insolventie, Nederlands
Instituut voor het Bank- en Effectenbedrijf, 152, (1999) that Article 18(1) is, in this regard, helpful
as a practical repetition of Article 4(2)(c), but is unnecessary. See EU Insolvency Regulation,
supra note 1.
11. MIGUEL VIRGÓS & FRANCISCO GARCIMARTÍN, THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS: A PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ¶ 364 (Kluwer Law International 2004).
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proceedings before the courts of the state within the territory where certain
acts by the liquidator have caused damages, when to such claims the law of
the latter Member State (including its provisions on private international
law) will be applicable.
The liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings only has authority to
exercise his powers in the other Member States within the limits of the
Insolvency Regulation, specifically outlined in the first sentence of Article
18(1), and therefore only “as long as no other insolvency proceedings have
been opened there nor any preservation measure to the contrary has been
taken there further to a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings in
that State.”12 This limitation relates to the possibility of opening secondary
insolvency proceedings pursuant to InsReg Article 3(2). 13 The Virgós-
Schmit Report refers to this limitation as a logical restriction, since the
assets cannot be subject to the powers of two different liquidators:
Once territorial proceedings have been opened, the direct powers of the
liquidator in the main proceedings no longer apply to assets situated in the
state of the opening of the territorial proceedings. The liquidator in the
territorial proceedings has exclusive powers over those assets. This does
not imply that the main liquidator loses all influence over the debtor’s
estate situated in the other ... state, but that that influence must be
exercised through the powers conferred on that liquidator by [the
Regulation] to coordinate the territorial proceedings and the main
proceedings.14
As indicated, the limitation in Article 18(1)’s first sentence also
concerns situations in which provisional protective measures are
incompatible with the exercise of the powers of the main liquidator which
have already been adopted as a consequence of the request to open
secondary proceedings. Examples of measures of this type in the
Netherlands are provided for in the Dutch Bankruptcy Act
(Faillissementswet) and include the placing under seal of the estate (which,
however, in practice hardly takes place),15 as well as measures to protect the
interests of creditors.16
The second sentence of InsReg Article 18(1) explicitly provides for the
main liquidator’s power to remove the debtor’s assets from the territory of
the Member State in which they are situated, subject to InsReg Articles 5
12. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18.
13. Id. art. 3(2).
14. Miguel Virgós & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings,
para. 163, Council 6500/1996 (May 3, 1996), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/952/1/insolvency_report_schmidt_1988.pdf.
15. Dutch Bankr. Act art. 7.
16. Pursuant to id. arts. 225, 290.
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and 7 (provisions on rights in rem and reservation of title respectively).17
The provision creates a substantive rule, as this power may also be
exercised when the lex concursus does not include a power of this nature. It
is therefore a pure “European Union” power. One may submit that the
power to remove assets already flows from the first sentence of InsReg
Article 18(1), and Article 4(2)(c) stating the lex concursus determines “the
respective powers of the debtor and the liquidator.” 18 The express
stipulation follows however from the need to remove any doubt.19
In addition to the limitations on the liquidator’s powers, InsReg Article
18(3) provides that the liquidator in the main proceedings shall, in
exercising his powers, “comply with the law of the Member State within the
territory of which he intends to take action, in particular with regard to
procedures for the realization of assets.”20 Such powers may not include
coercive measures or the right to rule on legal proceedings or disputes.21
The Virgós-Schmit Report explains how compliance with a Member
State’s law takes shape.22The following points can be noted: the general
principle of prohibition of the exercise of coercive powers in another state
applies to a “foreign” main liquidator, thus he may only take action in other
states if he complies with this principle.23 For this reason, Article 18(1)
expressly prohibits direct recourse to coercive measures. In fact, according
to the Virgós-Schmit Report: “Any use of force or coercive action is
17. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1) (“[The liquidator] may in particular
remove the debtor’s assets from the territory of the Member State in which they are situated,
subject to Articles 5 and 7.”); Id. arts. 5, 7.
18. Id. arts. 18(1), 4(2)(c).
19. See Virgós & Schmit, supra note 14, para. 161, in which it is stipulated that when
removing assets the liquidator must respect Articles 5 and 7, as the main proceedings cannot affect
rights in rem of creditors or third parties over assets situated, at the time of the opening, in a
Member State other than the state of the opening of proceedings.
20. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3).
21. Id. art. 18(2) relates to the liquidator appointed in secondary proceedings and therefore by
a court which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3(2). He “may in any other Member State claim
through the courts or out of court that moveable property was removed from the territory of the
State of the opening of proceedings to the territory of that other Member State after the opening of
the insolvency proceedings.” Id. Furthermore, he may “bring any action to set aside which is in
the interests of the creditors.” Id. On these additional powers of the secondary liquidator, see BOB
WESSELS, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW, ¶ 10762 (3rd ed. 2012).
22. Virgós & Schmit, supra note 14, para. 164.
23. The Insolvency Regulation, quite rightly, is built on the principle that a person may not act
as judge in its own case. Such a situation would be in direct conflict with e.g. the English law
“principle of natural justice nemo judex in sua causa”. See Ex parte Pinochet, [2000] AC (HL)
119 (mentioned in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATED GUIDE, ¶ 8.165 (G. Moss et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009)). See also K. Staak, Der deutsche
Insolvenzverwalter im europäischen Insolvenzrecht. Eine Analyse der EG-Verordnung Nr.
1346/2000 des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 über Insolvenzverfahren unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Person des deutschen Insolvenzverwalters, Europäischen
Hochschulschriften, Reihe II, Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 3889, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang
2004, at 144.
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excluded.”24 In any given case where the persons affected by a liquidator’s
act do not voluntarily agree to the liquidator’s performance, and coercive
measures are required with regard to assets or persons, the liquidator must
apply to the authorities of the state where the assets or persons are located
to have these measures adopted and implemented. Scholars Moss and Smith
correctly submit that local courts should have a “big-hearted” attitude:
“Also, as a matter of principle, local law and courts should as far as
possible make available to liquidators in main proceedings all the remedies
available to local liquidators, so as to avoid discrimination against a
European Union citizen. This may sometimes necessitate the opening of
secondary proceedings.” 25 The English text (“shall comply”), however,
appears to be stricter than various other texts, such as texts in the
Netherlands: “eerbiedigen” (which is the equivalent of “to respect”),
France: “doit respecter,” and in Spanish: “deberá respectar.” The rationale
is that the main liquidator “must take the constraints of the outside world as
a given.”26The liquidator shall exercise his powers without infringing the
laws of the state in which he takes action.
Where local law provides for certain formal procedures for the
realization of assets, the liquidator shall comply with the law of the state in
which the assets are located. The lex concursus of the main proceedings
establishes the extent of the powers of the liquidator and the manner in
which such powers may be exercised. Only the lex concursus of the main
proceedings is decisive with regard to, for example, whether the sale of
immoveable property can be a private market transaction or whether a sale
by public auction is necessary. Once the lex concursus has determined the
form of sale, the procedures by which the assets are realized must, however,
be in accordance with the provisions of the national law of the approached
Member State. If the latter lex fori concursus requires a sale by public
auction, the procedure for carrying out this sale in the state where the
immoveable property is situated shall therefore be determined by the law of
that latter state. On the other hand, if Dutch insolvency law prescribes the
approval of the court when a liquidator intends, for example, to start civil
law proceedings, the foreign main liquidator does not need this approval, as
Article 18(3) does not function as a conflict of law rule.27
The Insolvency Regulation does not provide for any form of objection
to the main liquidator’s performance. Due to the lack of provisions
regarding objections to the exercise of powers by the liquidator and the lack
24. Virgós & Schmit, supra note 14, para. 164.
25. THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATEDGUIDE, ¶ 8.165 (G. Moss et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
26. See, e.g., Virgós & Garcimartín, supra note 11, para. 369, and Staak, supra note 23, at 143,
who correctly submits that the principle of the lex concursus of the main insolvency proceedings
stays intact, with due respect to the lex fori of the other Member State.
27. See A.J. Berends, Insolventie in het internationaal privaatrecht 342 (2005) (doctoral
thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).
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of provisions requiring the liquidator to act or prevent the liquidator from
acting, the Virgós-Schmit Report submits that the authorities of the Member
States within which the powers are intended to be exercised shall have
jurisdiction to decide if the grounds for opposition lie in the non-recognition
of the proceedings opened in another Member State, or of the judgment
appointing the liquidator. 28 The examples in the Virgós-Schmit Report
relate to a situation in which the grounds for opposition are a breach by the
liquidator of the provisions of the Regulation that govern the exercise of his
powers in other Member States, such as InsReg Article 18(1) or InsReg
Article 3(3).29 Alternatively, “[i]f the opposition concerns the substance of
the exercise of those powers, i.e. the justification for a measure which the
liquidator intends to take, jurisdiction lies with the judicial authorities of the
state of the opening of the proceedings.”30
II. SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS
As explained, secondary proceedings can cut off the powers of the main
liquidator in as far as these are determined by the lex concursus of the
Member State, the court of which has opened main proceedings and
appointed her or him. The model of main insolvency proceedings opened in
one Member State, with the possibility of opening secondary insolvency
proceedings in other Member States, has its roots in the European
Convention on Certain Aspects of Bankruptcy, signed in Istanbul on June 5,
1990.31 Its introduction at that time was based on the utility of secondary
proceedings from the perspective of local creditors.32 Consequently, main
insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State do not deprive courts
28. Virgós & Schmit, supra note 14, para. 166.
29. Id.
30. See also M. Bogdan, in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A
COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE, supra note 25, ¶ 8.166. It should be noted that a Dutch
main liquidator in main liquidation proceedings will be subject to Article 69 of the Dutch
Faillissementswet:
1. Each of the creditors, the appointed creditors committee and also the bankrupt, may
file a petition with the supervisory judge to object against any act of the liquidator or to
procure that the supervisory judge orders the liquidator to perform or refrain from
performing any intended act. 2. Within three days the supervisory judge must issue his
decision having heard the liquidator.
Dutch Bankr. Act art. 69. For an extended analysis of Article 18, see WESSELS, supra note 21, ¶
10754.
31. For a list of signatories and ratifications, see European Convention on Certain
International Aspects of Bankruptcy, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/136.htm (last visited May 31, 2014). Article
44(k) has replaced the Istanbul Convention, which was signed by seven states and ratified by only
one Member State (Cyprus). Id.
32. See Manfred Balz, The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 485, 494 (1996).
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in other Member States of the authority to open secondary proceedings.33 If
these proceedings are opened they shall be secondary insolvency
proceedings within the meaning of Chapter III of the Regulation
(“Secondary Insolvency Proceedings”). The universal effect of the main
proceedings throughout the European Union does not apply to the
secondary proceedings, opened in another Member State, while the effects
of the secondary proceedings may not be challenged in other Member
States.34 Because the procedural and substantive effects of the secondary
proceedings are determined by the lex concursus, through rules contained in
InsReg Articles 4 and 28, the focus of the secondary insolvency
proceedings is the protection of local interests.35
Various types of secondary proceedings are listed by country in Annex
B to the Regulation. 36 They amount to approximately sixty types of
proceedings operational in 27 Member States. They are liquidation
proceedings—although the Insolvency Regulation uses the term “winding-
up proceedings”—within the meaning of Article 1(1).37 Such liquidation
proceedings aim to “realize the assets of the debtor, including where the
proceedings have been closed by a composition or other measure
terminating the insolvency, or closed by reason of the insufficiency of the
assets.”38
A. FUNCTION OF SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS
Although Annex B lists “national” insolvency “winding-up”
proceedings, the primary function of secondary proceedings dictates the
view that while a secondary proceeding may be “in name” a national
proceeding, it is however necessary to understand that they have a function
to operate within the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation. This function
can be explained in three ways:
(i) Although secondary proceedings are opened in another Member
State (in which the debtor has an “establishment”), 39 the secondary
33. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 16(2).
34. See id. art. 17(2).
35. See, e.g., S. Kolmann, Kooperationsmodelle im Internationalen Insolvenzrecht. Empfielt
sich für das Deutsche internationale Insolvenzrecht eine Neuorientierung? Schriften zum
Deutschen und Europäischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht, Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst und
Werner Gieseking (2001) (doctoral dissertation), who at page 13 characterizes this focus
understandably as a “protective function“ (Schutzfunction).
36. See generally Signe Viimsalu, The Meaning and Functioning of Secondary Insolvency
Proceedings, (2011) (doctoral thesis, University of Tartu, Estonia).
37. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (“collective insolvency proceedings
which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a [creditor]”; these
are listed in Annex A, amounting to around one hundred).
38. See id. arts. 2(c), 3(3).
39. See id. arts. 3(2), 2(h).
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proceedings are concerned with the same (insolvent) debtor as the main
insolvency proceedings;40
(ii) Despite the secondary proceedings only being permitted to be
proceedings as listed in Annex B, and therefore winding-up proceedings
with territorial effect,41 Chapter III of the Insolvency Regulation provides
the liquidator appointed in the main insolvency proceedings with several
powers to change the character of the secondary proceedings and to align
the proceedings in accordance with developments in the main proceedings
(see below); and
(iii) Despite “local” creditors being able to lodge claims in secondary
proceedings, they are also allowed to lodge claims in the main proceedings
or in any other secondary proceedings pending in other member States.42
Virgós and Garcimartín refer to secondary proceedings as having an
auxiliary function, and therefore, should be considered in the context of the
main proceedings.43 The Insolvency Regulation does not, however, aim to
ring-fence secondary proceedings; these proceedings have their formal
character and comprise assets, located in its territory, but the Regulation’s
concept of the universality of the main proceedings “is allowed to become
fragmented . . but [is] not finally renounced.”44 The mutual connection
between both proceedings is founded on the maxim that, ultimately, the
administration concerns one debtor with one estate and one group of
creditors. The Regulation stems from the need for “coordination of the
40. Article 2(h) defines “establishment” as “. . . any place of operations where the debtor
carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods.” Id. art. 2(h). The
Court of Justice of the European Union applies strict criteria. See Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl v.
Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2011 E.C.R. I-09915, para. 64, holding “that the term ‘establishment’
within the meaning of Article 3(2) must be interpreted as requiring the presence of a structure
consisting of a minimum level of organisation and a degree of stability necessary for the purpose
of pursuing an economic activity. The presence alone of goods in isolation or bank accounts does
not, in principle, meet that definition.” The court goes on to say that “. . . in order to ensure legal
certainty and foreseeability concerning the determination of the courts with jurisdiction, the
existence of an establishment must be determined, in the same way as the location of the centre of
main interests, on the basis of objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties.” Id. para.
63.
41. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, arts. 3(2), 27.
42. Id. art. 32.
43. Virgós & Garcimartín, supra note 11, ¶ 290. For a discussion of the supportive function of
secondary proceedings, see, e.g., H. Duursma-Kepplinger, D. Duursma & E. Chalupsky,
Europäische Insolvenzverordnung Kommentar, Wien: Springer 2002, art. 27, nr. 11; K. Staak, Der
deutsche Insolvenzverwalter im europäischen Insolvenzrecht. Eine Analyse der EG-Verordnung
Nr. 1346/2000 des Rates vom 29. Mai 2000 über Insolvenzverfahren unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Person des deutschen Insolvenzverwalters, Europäischen
Hochschulschriften, Reihe II, Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 3889, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang
2004, at 483; U. Ehricke, Das Verhältnis des Hauptinsolvenzverwalters zum
Sekundärinsolvenzverwalter bei grenzüberschreitenden Insolvenzen nach der EuInsVo, in
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftrecht (ZIP) 25-26/2005 at 1106.
44. See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES ¶ 7.136 (James J. Fawcett ed., 2d ed. 2005).
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measures to be taken regarding an insolvent debtor’s assets.”45 This may be
referred to as the principle of unity of estate.46
B. POWERS OF LIQUIDATOR INMAIN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
TO INTERFERE WITH SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS
The concept of one debtor with one estate to satisfy all creditors is
reflected—though less systematically—by the powers assigned to the
liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings by the Insolvency
Regulation. The following illustrates these rights and powers:
(i) He has the power to apply for secondary proceedings in other
member states;47
(ii) He can ask liquidators in the secondary proceedings for
information;48
(iii) He can demand that they cooperate with him;49
(iv) He can exercise the power to put forward certain proposals in the
context of the secondary proceedings;50
(v) He may request a stay of the process of liquidation in these
secondary proceedings;51
(vi) He may request the termination of a stay;52
(vii) He may propose a rescue plan in the secondary proceedings,53 also
during the stay of the process of liquidation;54
(viii) He shall lodge in other proceedings claims which have already
been lodged in the main proceedings;55
(ix) He has the power to participate in the other proceedings on the
same basis as the creditors;56
45. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3.
46. According to the Court of Justice of the EU’s Advocate General Sharpston, “[t]he
‘principle of unity’ means that there is a single set of insolvency proceedings”, and “[t]he
‘principle of universality’ means that those proceedings extend to all the debtor’s assets, wherever
they may be situated. The secondary proceedings may only be winding up proceedings and have
effects only in respect of assets located in that Member State . . . . The system laid down by the
Regulation has appropriately been referred to by one commentator as one of ‘co-ordinated
universality.’” See Bob Wessels, The Changing Landscape of Cross-border Insolvency Law in
Europe, XII JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 116 (2007). See also Case C-328/12, Ralph Schmid v
Lilly Hertel, http://curia.europa.eu (Sep. 10, 2013) (reference to a law review published in Estonia
(!)).
47. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 29.
48. Id. art. 31(1).
49. Id. art. 31(2).
50. Id. art. 31(3).
51. Id. art. 33(1).
52. Id. art. 33(2).
53. Id. art. 34(1).
54. Id. art. 34(3).
55. Id. art. 32(2).
56. Id. art. 32(3).
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(x) He has the right to request the return to the main proceedings of
anything already obtained by creditors as they have satisfied their claims by
any means on the assets of the debtor situated in the other member state;57
and
(xi) He has the power to collect any remaining assets from the
secondary proceedings if all claims in these proceedings have been met.58
These powers have their origin in the Insolvency Regulation, and
therefore may be regarded as the “union” powers of the main liquidator. In
addition, the liquidator may use his or her domestic powers in the whole of
the European Union, with the exception of Denmark.59 The recitals devote
only a few words to the guiding notion of unity of the estate. Recital 3
states that,
[t]he activities of undertakings have more and more cross-border effects
and are therefore increasingly being regulated by Community law. While
the insolvency of such undertakings also affects the proper functioning of
the internal market, there is a need for a Community act requiring
coordination of the measures to be taken regarding an insolvent debtor’s
assets.60
See also Recital 12, explaining the characteristics of main proceedings
and secondary proceedings, adding that “[m]andatory rules of coordination
with the main proceedings satisfy the need for unity in the Community.”61
Furthermore, as observed, Recital 20 states that “[m]ain insolvency
proceedings and secondary proceedings can, however, contribute to the
effective realization of the total assets only if all the concurrent proceedings
pending are coordinated. The main condition here is that the various
liquidators must cooperate closely, in particular by exchanging a sufficient
amount of information,” 62 while Recital 21 sets out the principle that
“[e]very creditor, who has his habitual residence, domicile or registered
office in the Community, should have the right to lodge his claims in each
of the insolvency proceedings pending in the Community relating to the
debtor’s assets.”63
To summarize, the Insolvency Regulation’s concept of the EU-wide
universality of main proceedings is that, ultimately, the administration
concerns one debtor with one estate and one group of creditors: the
principle of unity of estate. This maxim dominates the mutual relationship
between the main insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State, and
one or more secondary proceedings opened in another Member State in
57. Id. art. 20.
58. Id. art. 35.
59. See id. art. 18.
60. Id. recital 3.
61. Id. recital 12.
62. Id. recital 20.
63. Id. recital 21.
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order to protect the local interests. In line with this maxim, the Insolvency
Regulation assigns the liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings with
ten specific powers, which may therefore be regarded as “union” powers.64
In addition, the liquidator in the main proceedings has in principle the
authority to exercise all the powers conferred upon him by the lex
concursus in other Member States. These so-called domestic powers may
be exercised within the limits of the Insolvency Regulation, “as long as no
other insolvency proceedings have been opened. . . .”65 Once secondary
proceedings have been opened in another Member State, the liquidator in
the secondary proceedings is attributed exclusive, domestic power over the
assets situated in that Member State depriving the main liquidator of his
domestic powers in this respect.66 This does not mean that the secondary
proceedings are completely separated from the main proceedings and that
the main liquidator has become broken-winged. On the contrary, as the
main insolvency proceedings and the secondary proceedings are
interdependent proceedings, the liquidator in the secondary proceedings has
to fulfil his task under the “dominance” of the main liquidator.
Coordination of the secondary proceedings and the main proceedings is
essential for the effective realization of the total assets. InsReg Article 31(1)
and (2) provide for the mutual duty to communicate any information which
may be relevant to the other proceedings—within limits as to the extent of
the details or national legislation—and to cooperate.67
Equally essential in this respect is that the main liquidator may
intervene in secondary proceedings. In summary:
 The main liquidator shall be given by the liquidator of the
secondary proceedings “an early opportunity of submitting proposals
on the liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings.”68
This obligation regards important assets or decisions only. A rule is lacking
on how conflicts between the main liquidator and the secondary liquidator
are to be decided. It is submitted that the main liquidator has locus standi
under the applicability of the secondary proceedings.
 The main liquidator may apply for (i) realization of assets in
secondary proceedings to be suspended for a certain period; (ii) a stay
of the process of liquidation on a request of the main liquidator, to be
considered by the court in relation to the interests of the creditors in
the main proceedings;69 or (iii) an anticipated termination of a stay
provided by Article 33(2). 70 As the Insolvency Regulation does not
64. Id. arts. 31, 33, 34.
65. Id.; see also id. art. 18(1) (which relates to the possibility of opening secondary insolvency
proceedings pursuant to Article 3(2)).
66. Id. art. 5(5)(2)(b).
67. Id. arts. 31(1), (2).
68. Id. art. 31(3).
69. Id. art. 33(1).
70. Id. art. 33(2).
2014] Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings 75
provide explicitly for cross-border information of courts in proceedings in
different Member States, it is up to the main liquidator to ground that a stay
of the proceedings is in the interests of the creditors of the main
proceedings.
 The main liquidator may file a proposal for a rescue plan, a
composition or a comparable measure in the secondary proceedings in
case this is allowed under the law applicable to secondary
proceedings.71 When such a measure was proposed by those other than the
main liquidator, it needs the consent of the liquidator in the main
proceedings in order to become final; failing his agreement, such a measure
may become final if the financial interests of the creditors in the main
proceedings are not affected by the measure proposed.72 Here, again, the
court eventually has to consider the proposed measure in weighing the
financial interests of the creditors in the main proceedings, while the
Insolvency Regulation does not provide for cross-border communication
between courts in different member states.73During a stay of the process of
liquidation, only the main liquidator or the debtor with the former’s consent
may propose a rescue plan, etc.74
The main proceedings are being more or less fragmented by the
opening of one or more secondary insolvency proceedings in other member
states; the liquidator in the main proceedings is empowered to leave his
mark upon the general course of the total insolvency-unwinding.
Considering the union powers conferred upon the liquidator in the main
proceedings, assigning him as a dominant player, he may well be labelled
as the liquidator “en-chef.” In this way, the Insolvency Regulation’s
concept of European Union universality—the principle of unity of estate—
is respected without injuring the justified protection of local interests.
III. TREATMENT “AS IF” SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS HAD
BEEN OPENED
In Europe, there is a large body of literature dealing with all sorts of
aspects and problems related to reorganization or insolvency of
multinational corporate groups, providing views and ideas which all have
their pros and cons.75 In the absence of formal regulation many solutions
71. See id. art. 34.
72. Id. art. 34(1).
73. It is beyond the scope of this article to further elaborate that the Insolvency Regulation also
does not forbid cross-border communication between courts.
74. Cf. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 34(3).
75. See Bob Wessels, Multinational Groups of Companies under the EC Insolvency
Regulation: Where Do We Stand?, in ONDERNEMINGSRECHT 243–249; Bob Wessels, The
Ongoing Struggle of Multinational Groups of Companies under the EC Insolvency Regulation, 6
EUR. COMP. L. 169–77 (2009); IRIT MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE GROUPS (2009); Irit Mevorach, The ‘Home Country’ of a Multinational Enterprise
Group Facing Insolvency, in NORTON ANNUAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 89–
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have been presented. In my book, I categorized ten options of choices for
solution of group insolvencies, the seventh being “a treatment “as if”
secondary proceedings were opened.” 76
The argument is as follows: the Insolvency Regulation is based on the
possibility of having secondary proceedings running parallel to main
proceedings, while these secondary proceedings ultimately act as supportive
proceedings for the main insolvency proceedings.77 In legal practice, the
different ranking of claims, which is a logical consequence of opening
secondary proceedings, has been overcome in cases where courts have
treated creditors in other Member States “as if” a secondary insolvency
proceeding had indeed been opened in their respective jurisdiction, and thus
simplifying proceedings through consolidation of local priorities.78 The “as
if” approach therefore results in the treatment of such creditors as they
could expect under their national law. Examples of cases applying the
method are MG Rover,79 Collins & Aikman80 and Nortel Networks,81 shortly
explained below.
According to German author Hirte, the chosen solution is “a form of
‘procedural consolidation’” which allows for different insolvency
procedures but unites them in a single forum, avoids at least some
transaction costs and discrepancies; in a way, this represents a step toward a
group insolvency. 82 In the same line of thinking, the English author
Mevorach submits that she is in favor of “the use of COMI in order to
achieve ‘procedural consolidation’”, although stating that the concept needs
“clear rules.”83
In European case law, the “as if” treatment has been followed in cases
of enterprises in which subsidiary companies operate in other Member
States and are regarded as “establishment” for the purpose of opening of
116 (2009); CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS, EUROPÄISCHE INSOLVENZVERORDNUNG. KOMMENTAR 175
(Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, 4th ed., 2013); Nora Wouters & Alla Raykin,
Corporate Group Cross-border Insolvencies between the United States & European Union: Legal
& Economic Developments, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 387 (2013).
76. WESSELS, supra note 21, ¶ 10425. I introduced the ‘as if’ treatment in the second edition
of this book, in 2006.
77. Id. ¶
78. See Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency – Choice of Forum and Law: the European
Experience Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2007).
79. In re MG Rover Belux SA/NV (In Administration), In the Matter of The Insolvency Act
1986, [2006] (High Court of Justice Chancery).
80. In re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343.
81. In re Nortel Network, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206.
82. See Heribert Hirte, Towards a Framework for the Regulation of Corporate Groups’
Insolvencies, EUR. COMP. FIN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2008).
83. Irit Mevorach, Approprate Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency: A Universal
View, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 179, 189 (2007).
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secondary proceedings.84 The opening of secondary proceedings has been
prevented in the following cases,85 both occurring in 2006:
 High Court of Justice Birmingham, March 30, 2006 (MG Rover
Belux SA/NV). A Belgian company, a subsidiary of MG Rover, is debtor in
main proceedings, opened in England. The liquidators in the main
proceedings applied for permission to make distributions to the unsecured
creditors as a class in accordance with Belgian law. The court observed that
it had discretion to so permit, and that InsReg Article 3
does not oblige the supervising court to insist upon the adoption of its
domestic law to every aspect of the insolvency or to insist that local rights
can only be taken into account if secondary insolvency proceedings are
commenced. I can accordingly give permission for a payment that does
not strictly accord with English law if it is just and convenient to do so and
helps achieve the objective of the administration.86
 High Court of Justice, June 9, 2006 (Collins & Aikman). On July
15, 2005 the English High Court made administration orders for 24 of the
European Collins & Aikman companies on the basis that the proceedings in
the UK were main proceedings.87 After a successful business sale of a
number of the companies, the administrators sought directions from the
Court to distribute the sale proceeds to creditors in accordance with the
local laws of their jurisdiction. The administrators had given assurances in
these jurisdictions.88 Based on provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 and
the rule in Ex parte James,89 the Court considered that it expects its officers
(administrators in England and Wales are officers of the Court) to act in an
honorable and high minded way.90 A high ethical standard is expected and
required of an officer of the Court—potentially outweighing other
considerations including the prospect of a better realization for the estate.
Given the due care that administrators had given to all of the creditors’
interests, the court gave the directions requested by the administrators,
observing that alternatives open to the administrators were not considered
an attractive option, while opening secondary proceedings in the other
84. A view that theoretically is not without problems SeeWESSELS, supra note 21, ¶ 10538.
85. For literature, see John Alderton & Antoine Adeline, The EC Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings: Streamlining Cross-Border Insolvency? The Contrasting Approaches of the Courts
in England and France, 3 INT’L CORP. RESCUE 257 (2006); see also R. Dammann & M. Sénéchal,
La procédure secondaire du Règlement (CE) n° 1346/2000: mode d’emploi, Lamy Droit des
Affaires (October 2006); see also Stephen Taylor, Avoiding Secondary Proceedings in EU
Insolvency Regulation Cases, 4 INT’L CORP. RESCUE 7 (2007).
86. In reMG Rover Belux SA/NV, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1296.
87. In re Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343.
88. Id. para. 10.
89. Ex parte James, in Re Condon (1873-74) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 609 (Eng.), [1874-80] All E.R.
Rep. 388. On the alleged diminished role of the rule after the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in
Bloom v. The Pensions Regulator, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3010 (Eng.), see William Wilson, The Rule
in Ex Parte James: What’s Left?, 27 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 12 (2014).
90. In re Collins & Aikman, para. 17.
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Member States (registered offices of subsidiaries as “establishment[s]”)
could lead to delay, expense, and undesirable complication and
uncertainty.91 Within this discretion the administrators treated creditors in
other Member States as if a secondary proceeding has been opened there.92
Subsequently, in 2009, Nortel Networks filed for insolvency:
 High Court of Justice February 11, 2009 (Nortel Network). On
January 14, 2009 the High Court of Justice opened insolvency proceeding
regarding Nortel Networks, including some 18 subsidiaries of some 15 EU
Member State jurisdictions (centre of main interests (COMI) of all
continental subs is in England). A few weeks later an application is made
with a view to obtaining assistance from the courts of these various
Member States in the form of prior notification to the Joint Administrators
of any request or application for the opening of secondary insolvency
proceedings in those jurisdictions and the giving to the Joint Administrators
of an opportunity to be heard on any such application.
According to Judge Patten, in the decision of February 11, 2009, this is
intended to enable them to explain to the relevant court why such
proceedings would not be in the interests of the creditors: “It is not, of
course, the function of this court or the purpose of the letters of request to
indicate to the courts to which the letters are sent how they should
determine any application to open secondary proceedings.” 93 The High
Court observed it had “an inherent jurisdiction to issue a letter of request to
a foreign court in appropriate circumstances and the only issue which I have
to decide is whether I should exercise this jurisdiction in this particular
case”94 Judge Patten provided four main grounds:
(i) The request for the assistance of the various foreign courts
stems directly from the duty of cooperation imposed by InsReg Article
31(2).95
(ii) “Although framed in terms of cooperation between office-
holders, the duty has been treated by the courts of Member States as
incorporating or reflecting a wider obligation which extends to the courts
which exercise control of insolvency procedures in their respective
jurisdictions.”96 Patten J considers in Re Stojevic (November 9, 2004, 28 R
225/04w), a judgment of the Vienna Higher Regional Court, in which it
said, “Although the wording of Art 31 of the EU Insolvency Regulation
only obliges the trustees in bankruptcy to cooperate, this also applies to the
91. Id. paras. 41, 42, 45.
92. Id. para. 49.
93. In re Nortel Network, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206.
94. Id. para. 9.
95. Id. para. 10.
96. Id. para. 11.
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court according to the prevailing opinion and under the UNCITRAL model
law.”97
(iii) For this obligation to be effective—so the Court—“it is
obviously desirable for the court dealing with an application to open
secondary insolvency proceedings to be provided with the reasons why
such proceedings might have an adverse impact on the main proceedings.”98
An example of the advantage of permitting the Joint Administrators in
English main proceedings to be heard in relation to the opening of
secondary proceedings in another Member State can be found in the
decision of the Court of Appeal of Versailles in Rover France SAS [2006]
I.L.Pr. 32.
(iv) Article 33(1) allows a court that has opened secondary
proceedings to stay the process of liquidation at the request of the liquidator
in the main proceedings subject to suitable measures being taken to
guarantee the interests of creditors in the secondary proceedings.99 This
would therefore halt the realization of assets located in the State of the
secondary proceedings. But it would not prevent the continuation of
winding-up proceedings in the Member States in which each of the
Companies is incorporated,100 and the effect of the commencement and
continuation of such proceedings is likely to be to cause the relevant
Company to cease to trade, save for the purposes of winding up.101 The
Joint Administrators took the view that the continuation of trading is
necessary in order to achieve the re-organization of the Nortel Group.
After this argumentation, surprisingly but rightly using French and
Austrian judgments, Judge Patten concludes,
In these circumstances, it seems to me highly desirable that the assistance
of the foreign courts specified in the Schedule to the draft order should be
sought with a view to enabling the Joint Administrators to be heard prior
to the opening of any secondary insolvency proceedings in these
jurisdictions and I will therefore authorize the sending of appropriate
letters of request to the judicial authorities in those States.102
97. Id.
98. Id. para. 12.
99. Id. para. 13.
100. Id. (referring to In re Collins & Aikman, Higher Regional Court of Graz, Oct. 20, 2005, 3
R 149/05).
101. Id.
102. As an aside, the High Court judgment seems a strong argument to advance cross-border
cooperation between courts, although it must be said—with all due respect—that Article 31 only
applies when main proceedings have been opened in one Member State (in the Nortel case, the
UK) and in another Member State secondary proceedings indeed have been opened. This was
clearly not the case at that stage of the proceedings because the very purpose of issuing the letters
of request was if possible to avert the opening of secondary proceedings in other Member States.
Also, the reference to the Vienna court’s decision seems to overlook that Austria is one of only a
few Member States that lists the “bankruptcy court” (Konkursgericht) in Annex C, which lists
“liquidators.” For this reason, Article 31 applies to the Austrian court in its role as “liquidator.”
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The “as if” method chosen by the courts to prevent the formal opening
of secondary insolvency proceedings and treat “local” creditors as if
secondary proceedings had been opened has led to a name-game to express
this approach in between the traditional well-known theories of
universalism (universality) and territorialism (territoriality). U.S. scholars
have introduced an expression for this pragmatic approach. Professor
Janger, from Brooklyn Law School, introduced the term “virtual
territoriality.” 103 Virtual territoriality envisions a global, procedurally
centralized insolvency case that, to the extent possible, respects the
entitlements created by the various jurisdictions where the debtor conducts
his activities.104 The procedural insolvency laws of the “home” country
should govern the case, but even in a case where all assets are administered
centrally, the choice of substantive law should be determined by ordinary,
non-insolvency related, choice-of-law principles. It is Janger’s purpose to
facilitate (i) the administration of a global insolvency case, and
simultaneously (ii) the international acceptance of rescue based domestic
insolvency regimes.105 In choosing for the latter, Janger argues that “virtual
territoriality” respects local policy choices, such as the entitlements that
exist under local “debtor/creditor laws.” 106 It comes to no surprise that
Janger uses the Collins & Aikman case as a practical example.107
Professor Janger’s proposal has been criticized by Professor Jay L.
Westbrook. 108 Westbrook disagrees with the divide between universalism
(placing the administration of the case in one main proceeding) and
territorialism (allocating the debtor’s assets into local pools, each governed
by local priority rules). He submits that such an approach rests upon two
conceptual errors saying, “[i]t ties local law to the assets that happen to be
seized locally, rather than identifying legitimate local interests that should
be served in a global set of proceedings.”109 Because multinational creditors
generally make claims in all significant local proceedings, Janger’s
approach prefers local distribution rules but it does not necessarily protect
local creditors and leaves deserving local creditors to suffer in cases where
circumstances have landed more substantial assets elsewhere. 110 Thus,
Westbrook submits as a second objection that the theory relies upon a
For other legal disputes (e.g., fee disputes in the Rover case), see WESSELS, supra note 21,
¶ 10846b et seq.
103. Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 402 (2010).
104. Id. at 402.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 401.
107. Id. at 436–38.
108. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Comment on Universal Proceduralism, 48 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 505 (2010).
109. Id. at 503.
110. Id.
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substance-procedure distinction that is “as clumsy here as it is elsewhere in
the law.”111 According to Westbrook, Janger’s distinctions
are readily shown to illustrate the impossibility of separating, for example,
the control effects of the bankruptcy moratorium (which may require
determining the substance of the claim) from its purely procedural aspects.
Finally, this approach attempts to avoid forum shopping while opening the
way for forum stashing, encouraging irresponsible debtors to switch their
assets to haven jurisdictions with management friendly laws.112
Close to Janger’s proposals, Professor Pottow’s proposal, of the
University of Michigan Law School, names the proceedings resulting from
“virtual territoriality” as “synthetic secondary proceedings.”113 According to
Pottow, these types of proceedings should be limited to: “(1) real property
disputes; (2) disputes where local judicial authority is needed to exercise
equitable or other nonmonetary bankruptcy-related relief; and (3) other
extraordinary circumstances pursuant to some safety valve escape
clause.”114 Excluded from these topics are disputes involving a divergence
in priority rules between the main and secondary jurisdiction. Here the term
“synthetic secondary proceedings” is suggested, within the confines of the
main proceedings, and the creation of an international registry of
“approved” bankruptcy priorities by a respected non-state actor. The
adoption of that registry should be by express statutory provision in
jurisdictions where such authorization is required, or by judges in the
exercise of their discretion in places where it is not. Under Pottow’s idea,
the non-state actor could be International Insolvency Institute (III).115
In France this kind of “as if” treatment has been named “virtual
contractual secondary proceedings” by Menjucq and Dammann. 116 If I
understand correctly, the approach has, what the Dutch call, older papers. It
goes back to the theory of “Neuorientierung,” or New Orientation proposed
by Professor Von Wilmowsky of the University of Erfurt, Germany. In
1997, he expressed fundamental criticism concerning both traditional
concepts—universality and territoriality—because both claim applicability
with regard to all types of legal questions in an international insolvency
111. Id.
112. Id. at 503–04.
113. John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 579 (2011).
114. Id. at 599.
115. According to its website, the International Insolvency Institute is a non-profit, limited-
membership organization “. . . dedicated to advancing and promoting insolvency as a respected
discipline in the international field. Its primary objectives include improving international co-
operation in the insolvency area and achieving greater co-ordination among nations in
multinational business reorganizations and restructurings.” INT’L INSOLVENCY INST.,
www.iiiglobal.org.
116. See Michel Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, Regulation No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings: Facing the Companies Group Phenomenon, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 145, 154 (2008).
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context.117 Under the universality approach, the lex concursus of the State in
which primary or main proceedings are opened is decisive on the question
of “asset deployment” (reorganization or liquidation) and on the question of
“asset distribution” (distribution of the proceeds or allocation of losses
respectively).118 Von Wilmowsky advocates a split. Questions concerning
“asset deployment” should be determined by the lex concursus of the State
in which the insolvency proceedings are opened, whereas distribution,
including the ranking and preferences of a claim, should be decided by the
law of the group of persons for whose benefit the insolvency law
intervenes. 119 With regard to “asset deployment,” Von Wilmowsky,
favoring a choice of applicable insolvency law, agrees with the ideas of
Rasmussen in that the debtor should be able to make a choice under his by-
laws as to which insolvency law is decisive for the opening of insolvency
proceedings.120
Conversely, with regard to the question of “distribution,” Von
Wilmowsky submits that every State should intervene on behalf of the
creditors it aims to protect, although the money that will be distributed
should not be limited to the money available in the insolvency proceedings
in the respective State.121
IV. OVERARCHING PRINCIPLE OF SINCERE COOPERATION
EX ARTICLE 4(3) EU TREATY
One of the goals of main insolvency proceeding is the reorganization of
the debtor’s affairs. If these affairs include assets in another Member State,
the opening in the latter state of secondary proceedings—which must be
winding-up proceedings—may clash with the prime goal of the main
insolvency proceedings. How to solve this matter? Is it possible to align
main and secondary proceeding goals?
An example is provided by the judgment of November 22, 2012 of the
Court of Justice of the European Union in the Bank Handlowy case.122
Following the approval of a rescue plan (procédure de sauvegarde as main
117. See Peter von Wilmowsky, Internationales Insolvenzrecht–Plädoyer für eine
Neuorientierung, in WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN (WM) 1997, 1461 [hereinafter Wilmowsky,
Internationales Insolvenzrecht]; Peter von Wilmowsky, Choice of Law in International
Insolvencies–A Proposal For Reform, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALISATION: CONFLICT OF
LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 197 et seq.
(Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2000). The views of Von Wilmosky have been
criticized by Kolmann, supra note 35, at 468, and Berends, supra note 10, at 53, but have been
supported by Liersch, Sicherungsrechte im Internationalen Insolvenzrecht, in NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR DAS RECHT DER INSOLVENZ UND SANIERUNG (NZI) (2002), at 15.
118. Wilmowsky, Internationales Insolvenzrecht, supra note 117, at 1463.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1464.
121. Id.
122. Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie “SA” v. Christianapol Sp. z.o.o.,
http://curiaeuropa.eu, (2012).
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insolvency proceedings) by the French court in the city of Meaux, the
Polish court, confronted with the request to open secondary proceedings,
“asked the Tribunal de commerce de Meaux whether” the insolvency
proceedings in France—which were main proceedings for the purposes of
the Regulation—were still pending. 123 The answer given by the French
court did not provide the necessary clarification.124 The referring court then
consulted an expert. 125 The Polish court (Sąd Rejonowy Poznań-Stare
Miasto w Poznaniu) then decided to stay the proceedings pending before it
and to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary
ruling.126 The InsReg Article 27 was interpreted as meaning that it permits
the opening of secondary insolvency proceedings in the Member State in
which the debtor has an establishment, where the main proceedings have a
protective purpose; “It is for the court having jurisdiction to open secondary
proceedings to have regard to the objectives of the main proceedings and to
take account of the scheme of the Regulation, in keeping with the principle
of sincere cooperation.”127
The Court of Justice of the EU reasoned:
The interpretation … to the effect that the opening of main proceedings
having a protective purpose precludes the opening of secondary
proceedings, in addition to being incompatible with the wording of the
provisions in question, runs counter to the recognised role of secondary
proceedings in the system established by the Regulation. Although
secondary proceedings are intended, inter alia, to protect local interests,
they may also, as stated in recital 19 in the preamble to the Regulation,
serve other purposes, which is why they may be opened at the request of
the liquidator in the main proceedings, when the efficient administration
of the estate so requires.
As observed by the referring court, the fact remains that the opening of
secondary proceedings, which, under Article 3(3) of the Regulation, must
be winding-up proceedings, risks running counter to the purpose served by
main proceedings, which are of a protective nature.
It should be noted that the Regulation provides for a certain number of
mandatory rules of coordination intended to ensure, as expressed in recital
12 in the preamble thereto, the need for unity in the Community. In that
system, the main proceedings have a dominant role in relation to the
secondary proceedings, as stated in recital 20 in the preamble to the
Regulation.
The liquidator in the main proceedings thus has certain prerogatives at his
disposal which allow him to influence the secondary proceedings in such a




127. Id. at 12.
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way that the protective purpose of the main proceedings is not jeopardised.
Under Article 33(1) of the Regulation, he may request an order for stay of
the process of liquidation for up to three months, which may be continued
or renewed for similar periods. Under Article 34(1) of the same regulation,
the liquidator in the main proceedings may propose closing the secondary
proceedings with a rescue plan, a composition or a comparable measure.
Article 34(3) provides that, during the stay of the process of liquidation
under Article 33(1) of the Regulation, only the liquidator in the main
proceedings or the debtor, with the liquidator’s consent, may propose such
measures.
The principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) EU requires
the court having jurisdiction to open secondary proceedings, in applying
those provisions, to have regard to the objectives of the main proceedings
and to take account of the scheme of the Regulation, which, …, aims to
ensure efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings through
mandatory coordination of the main and secondary proceedings
guaranteeing the priority of the main proceedings.128
Therefore, the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in InsReg
Article 4(3) requires the court with jurisdiction over secondary proceedings
to address the challenge of (i) giving adequate regard to the objectives of
the main insolvency proceedings, and (ii) takng into account the scheme of
the Regulation, which aims to ensure efficient and effective cross-border
insolvency proceedings through mandatory coordination of the main and
secondary proceedings and guaranteeing the priority of the main
proceedings.129 In doing so, the “secondary” court will be challenged to
communicate with the liquidator in the main proceedings and to ensure that
he will cooperate.130
128. Id. at 10.
129. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(3).
130. The European Commission, with assistance from the International Insolvency Institute,
supports a large study (by Leiden Law School and Nottingham Law School) for the development
of principles and guidelines courts in the EU can use when they are involved in cross-border
insolvency cases. Several elements of these EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court
Principles and Guidelines (in development) build further upon the Global Principles for
Cooperation in International Cases (Global Principles), laid down in a report from June 2012,
presented to the American Law Institute (ALI) and International Insolvency Institute (III). These
Global Principles were drafted by Professors Ian F. Fletcher (University College London, UK) and
myself. See AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws Matters in Insolvency Cases, in
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY CASES ann. at 200 (2012), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm. These Global Principles
build further on the American Law Institute’s Principles of Cooperation among the member-states
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These Principles were evolved within
the American Law Institute’s Transnational Insolvency Project, conducted between 1995 and
2000, for which the Reporter was Professor Jay L. Westbrook, with the objective to provide a non-
statutory basis for cooperation in international insolvency cases involving two or more of the
NAFTA states, consisting of the United States, Canada and Mexico. See AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY:
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V. SINCE 2012: AMENDING THE EU INSOLVENCY
REGULATION
The European Insolvency Regulation has been in force for over twelve
years. InsReg Article 46 (“Reports”) reads,
No later than [June 1,] 2012, and every five years thereafter, the
Commission shall present to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Economic and Social Committee a report on the application of this
Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if need be by a proposal for
adaptation of this Regulation.131
On December 12, 2012, the proposal for a Regulation amending the
Insolvency Regulation was published. 132 It contains an Explanatory
Memorandum, 13 recitals and 51 amendments. It is accompanied by a
report on the application of the Insolvency Regulation (Report), as per
InsReg Article 46,133 and a so-called “Impact Assessment.”134
In the Explanatory memorandum it is stated that the Insolvency
Regulation is generally considered to operate successfully in facilitating
cross-border insolvency proceedings within the European Union. 135 The
consultation of stakeholders and legal and empirical studies commissioned
by the European Commission however have revealed a range of problems
in the application of the Regulation in practice. Moreover, the Regulation
COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003). The development of the European
project (known as “JudgeCo project”) can be followed via my weblog, at www.bobwessels.nl. The
JudgeCo project as such only touches lightly on the topic of communication between courts and
liquidators.
131. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 46.
132. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, at 1. I should mention that
I served as an expert to the European Commission in Brussels, assigned with drafting the text of
the proposal.
133. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on
Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 743 final (May 29, 2000), in EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF
REGULATION NO. 1346/2000/EC ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf [hereinafter the Heidelberg-
Luxembourg-Vienna Report, indicating the universities coordinating the work].
134. See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the
Document Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, SWD (2012)
416 final (Dec. 12, 2012); Commission Staff Working Document, Executive Summary of the
Impact Assessment, Accompanying the Document Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on
Insolvency Proceedings, SWD (2012) 417 final (Dec. 12, 2012). I served as an advisor to the
consultancy firm preparing the report for this assessment. Also on 12 December 2012 a
Communication was published, containing ‘A new approach to business failure and insolvency’.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on A New European Approach to Business Failure and
Insolvency, available at http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/european-business-rescue-looking-for-the-
best-approach. For its follow-up, see European Commission’s Recommendation, “New Approach
to Business Failure and Insolvency”, (Mar. 12 2014) available at
http://bobwessels.nl/blog/page/11/.
135. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, Explanatory
Memorandum.
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“does not sufficiently reflect current EU priorities and national practices in
insolvency law, in particular in promoting the rescue of enterprises in
difficulties.” 136 It further clarifies that “[t]he overall objective of the
revision of the Insolvency Regulation is to improve the efficiency of the
European framework for resolving cross-border insolvency cases in view of
ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market and its resilience in
economic crises. . . .”137
The Commission’s proposal in general has received positive
reactions.138 It should be noticed that the developments in changes of the
cross-border insolvency regime in the Insolvency Regulation is a part of a
larger wave (albeit slow) of change in insolvency regimes in Europe.139
The Explanatory Memorandum signals “five main shortcomings” in the
present Insolvency Regulation: (1) the limited scope of the Regulation; (2)
the ongoing practice of “forum shopping” due to the inconsistent
application of the vague concept of the debtor’s “centre of main interests”
(COMI); (3) the inadequate system of publication and registration of
insolvency proceedings; (4) the lack on rules dealing with the insolvency of
multinational groups; and (5) the lack of coordination between main and
secondary insolvency proceedings.140
 Scope of the Regulation. The proposal extends the scope
of the Regulation by revising the definition of insolvency proceedings to
include hybrid and pre-insolvency proceedings as well as debt discharge
proceedings and other insolvency proceedings for natural persons which
currently do not fit the definition in InsReg Article 1(1).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See David Marks, European Insolvency Regulation: Where Does it Go Next?, 10 INT’L
CORP. RESCUE 22 (2013); Horst Eidenmüller, A New Framework for Business Restructuring in
Europe: The EU Commission Proposals for a Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation and
Beyond (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 199/2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230690; M. Menjucq, La proposition de règlement modifiant le
règlement (CE) no. 1346/2000 sur les procédures d’insolvabilité: une evolution mais pas de
revolution, Revue des procédures collectieves, Janvier 2013, 18; Gabriel Moss, A Very Decent
Proposal: the European Commission’s Proposal for Reforming the EC Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings 1346/2000, 26 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 55 (2013). Rather critical is G.
McCormack, Reforming the European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal and Policy Perspective, 10
J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 41 (2014).
139. See IAN F. FLETCHER & BOB WESSELS, HARMONIZATION OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN
EUROPE 147 (Kluwer 2012) (the concluding chapter is available via
http://bobwessels.nl/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Perspectives-on-harmonisation-of-
insolvency-law-in-Europe-Ch-7.pdf); Bob Wessels, 5th Edwin Coe Lecture in Brussels: On the
Future of European Insolvency Law (Oct. 11, 2012) (forthcoming), available at
http://bobwessels.nl/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ON-THE-FUTURE-OF-
EUROPEAN-INSOLVENCY-LAW-Wessels-2012-10-21.pdf; Bob Wessels, Themes of the
Future: Rescue Businesses and Cross-border Cooperation, 27 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 49
(2014).
140. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, Explanatory
Memorandum.
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 Jurisdiction. The proposal clarifies the existing jurisdiction
rules and improves the procedural framework for determining
jurisdiction.141
 Publicity of proceedings and lodging of claims. The
proposal requires Member States to publish the relevant court decisions in
cross-border insolvency cases in a publicly accessible electronic register
and provides for the interconnection of national insolvency registers. It also
introduces standard forms for the lodging of claims.
 Groups of companies. The proposal provides for a
coordination of the insolvency proceedings concerning different members
of the same group of companies by obliging the liquidators and courts
involved in the different main proceedings to cooperate and communicate
with each other; in addition, it gives the liquidators involved in such
proceedings the procedural tools to request a stay of the respective other
proceedings and to propose a rescue plan for the members of the group
subject to insolvency proceedings.142
 Lack of coordination between main and secondary
insolvency proceedings. For present purposes, it is noticeable that
secondary proceedings will change in nature and function rather drastically.
The proposal provides for a more efficient administration of insolvency
proceedings: (i) by enabling the court to refuse the opening of secondary
proceedings if this is not necessary to protect the interests of local creditors;
(ii) by abolishing the requirement that secondary proceedings must be
winding-up proceedings (and therefore deleting Annex B); and (iii) by
improving the cooperation between main and secondary proceedings, in
particular by extending the cooperation requirements to the courts
involved.143 These changes have been proposed in InsReg Article 18(1) and
a new Article 29a(2), as well as the deletion of the “liquidation only”
requirement for secondary proceedings in a revised InsReg Article 3(3).144
The proposal broadens the duties of cross-border cooperation and
communication for liquidators, 145 extends these duties to the courts
141. See Frederico M. Mucciarelli, The Unavoidable Persistence of Forum Shopping in
European Insolvency Law (Working Paper Ser.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375654.
142. For mixed reactions, see Horst Eidenmüller and Tilmann Frobenius, Ein neues Konzept zur
Bewältigung von Gruppeninsolvenzen: Verfahrenskonsolidierung im Kontext nationaler und
internationaler Reformvorhaben, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258874; Eidenmüller,
supra note 138; Irit Mevorach, The New Proposed Regime for EU Corporate Groups in
Insolvency: A Critical Note, 4 CORP. RESCUE& INSOLVENCY 89 (2013).
143. See Bob Wessels, Some Remarks on Exchange of Information in International Insolvency
Cases, in J. REIZIGER, A.M. VAN DER SCHEE E.A. (RED.), CURATOR EN INFORMATIE, 203–24
(Kluwer, 2013), available at http://bobwessels.nl/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Insolad-
Jaarboek-2013.pdf; Michelle Reumers, Cooperation Between Liquidators and Courts in
Insolvency Proceedings of Related Companies Under the Proposed Revised EIR, 7 EUR. COMP. &
FIN. L. REV. 544 (2013).
144. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 18(1), 29a(2), 3(3).
145. Id. art. 31.
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involved, 146 creates a new regime for mandatory cooperation and
communication between liquidators and courts, 147 and explicitly allows
“protocols” as a legitimate form of cooperation.148 The communication and
cooperation duties apply by way of analogy to such duties in-group
insolvencies.149
In paragraph 3.1.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum (“Secondary
insolvency proceedings”) the European Commission explains that
“[s]everal modifications are proposed with the aim of improving the
efficient administration of the debtor’s estate in situations where the debtor
has an establishment in another Member State.”150 The proposal, however,
will not affect the possibility of the liquidator to request the opening of
secondary proceedings, on the basis of InsReg Article 29(a),
where this would facilitate the administration of complex cases, for
example where a considerable number of employees have to be laid off in
the State of the establishment. In such cases, the opening of local
proceedings and the appointment of a local liquidator may still be useful to
ensure an efficient administration of the debtor’s estate.151
The European Commission explains that allowing the main liquidator
to give an “undertaking” to local creditors elsewhere prevents creditors
from requesting the secondary proceedings.152 Creditors should be treated
“as if” secondary proceedings had been opened:
The court seized with a request for opening secondary proceedings should
be able, if so requested by the liquidator in the main proceedings, to refuse
the opening or to postpone the decision if such opening would not be
necessary to protect the interests of local creditors. This could, for
example, be the case if an investor made an offer to buy the company on a
going-concern basis and that offer would give more to the local creditors
than a liquidation of the company’s assets. The opening of secondary
proceedings should also not be necessary, if the liquidator of the main
proceedings promises to the local creditors that they would be treated in
the main proceedings as if secondary proceedings had been opened and
that the rights they would have had in such a case with respect to the
determination and ranking of their claims would be respected in the
distribution of the assets. The practice of such ‘synthetic secondary
proceedings’ has been developed in several cross-border insolvency cases
where main proceedings were opened in the United Kingdom (notably in
the insolvency proceedings concerning Collins & Aikman, MG Rover and
Nortel Networks). The English courts accepted that the English liquidators
146. Id. art. 31a.
147. Id. art. 31b.
148. Id. art. 31(1), 31a(3)(d).
149. Id. art. 42a, 42b.
150. Id. Explanatory Memorandum, para. 3.1.3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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were entitled to distribute part of the assets according to the law of the
Member State where the establishment was located. Since such a practice
is currently not possible under the law of many Member States, the
proposal introduces a rule of substantive law enabling the liquidator to
give such undertakings to local creditors with binding effect on the
estate.153
The Commission therefore codified a cross-border practice, set out in
Part IV above, that has been received as useful, or even as “rather
promising,” an approach that “could serve as a model for an improvement”
of the Insolvency Regulation.154
Horst Eidenmüller is critical because the basic model of the legal
system for the Insolvency Regulation remains in a mode of “modified” or
“mitigated” universalism or, as I prefer to call it, in “coordinated”
universality.155 Eidenmüller submits that the chosen route of the possibility
of “synthetic secondary proceedings” is a distinctly second-best approach
for addressing the central regulatory problem in international insolvency
cases. These proceedings,
are conditioned on an undertaking by the liquidator appointed in the main
insolvency proceeding that guarantees local creditors a treatment
replicating their position under “real” secondary proceedings. “Synthetic
secondary proceedings” address some of the problems associated with
secondary proceedings such as higher transaction costs or problems with
respect to transnational restructurings. However, the condition just
described retains one of the underlying flaws of territorialism, namely, that
it might skew investment decisions. Moreover, whenever the required
undertaking is not given, the full machinery of a main proceeding, coupled
with a potential multiplicity of secondary proceedings, may be set in
motion, with all the negative economic effects, for example, high
transaction costs, this imposes on transnational restructurings. Agreeing to
a bankruptcy contract in a complex transnational corporate restructuring,
for example, is an extremely complicated and costly task, and the costs
might even skyrocket if disputes under such a contract arise and
enforcement issues surface.156
153. Id.
154. Quotations are taken from the Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna Report, supra note 133, at
356.
155. Eidenmüller, supra note 138, at 18.
156. Eidenmüller is concerned about the imprecise cooperation duties reflecting the
coordination model between main and secondary insolvency proceedings (“. . . these efforts might
prove counter-productive since they could potentially impose higher transaction costs”) and
defends that the “. . . correct standard would be the achievement of a Pareto-superior outcome, id
est, the possibility of enhancing the net value of the assets available for distribution in all
proceedings involved.” Id. at 18–19.
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VI. THE “AS IF” UNDERTAKING
With regard to an “as if” undertaking, the proposal of the European
Commission of December 2012 contains the following text formulating
Amendment (28) to InsReg Article 18(1):
1. The liquidator appointed by a court which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 3(1) may exercise all the powers conferred on him by the law of
the State of the opening of proceedings in another Member State, as long
as no other insolvency proceedings have been opened there nor any
preservation measure to the contrary has been taken there further to a
request for the opening of insolvency proceedings in that State. Subject to
Articles 5 and 7, he may in particular remove the debtor’s assets from the
territory of the Member State in which they are situated. He may also give
the undertaking that the distribution and priority rights which local
creditors would have had if secondary proceedings had been opened will
be respected in the main proceedings. Such an undertaking shall be
subject to the form requirements, if any, of the State of the opening of the
main proceedings and shall be enforceable and binding on the estate.157
The italicized sentence is new.
It is manifest that an “undertaking” is an English legal concept. As I
understand English law, the idea behind giving such an undertaking, in the
meaning of Article 18(1)’s last sentence (proposal), is the insolvency office
holder’s obligation to temper his strict adherence to the rules with a respect
for honest dealing and justice.158 In England, from this principle in ex parte
James it follows, that the insolvency office holder must not take advantage
of creditors without giving credit for their debts nor insist on taking
windfalls from another’s mistake.159 Furthermore, under English law as I
understand it, an administrator can be sued by creditors or subsequent office
holders if it is found that he has misapplied or retained money or other
property of the company, has become accountable for money or other
property of the company, has breached a fiduciary or other duty in relation
to the company, or has been guilty of misfeasance.160 However, in case an
“undertaking” will be included in the text of the EU Insolvency Regulation,
these “English” explanations do not bear consequences, not only because of
the fact that not all insolvency office holders in other EU Member States are
“officers of the court”, but because an “undertaking” has to be regarded and
interpreted as an “autonomous” term. The Court of Justice of the EU held in
2012 in the Bank Handlowy case:
157. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, art. 18(1) (emphasis
added).
158. See Ex parte James, in Re Condon, (1873-74) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 609, [1874-80] All E.R.
Rep. 388.
159. See Re T & N Ltd, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 2870.
160. See Insolvency Act, 1986, para. 75, sch. B1 (Eng.). For the equivalent provision in the case
of liquidators, see id. § 212.
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“Although it is true that, where there are doubts with respect to their
wording, provisions of European Union law must be given an autonomous
and uniform interpretation, having regard to the context of the provision
and the objective pursued by the legislation in question, the Court has
nevertheless held that that principle holds true only for those provisions
which make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the
purpose of determining their meaning and scope (see, to that effect, Case
C-396/09 Interedil Srl, [2011] ECR I-09915, paragraph 42 . . .).
Accordingly, questions such as the conditions for and effects of the
closure of insolvency proceedings, about which Article 4(2)(j) of the
Regulation makes an express reference to national law, cannot be given an
autonomous interpretation, but must be decided under the lex concursus
designated as applicable.161
In December 2013, the European Parliament (EP) presented its final
report on the European Commission’s December 2012 proposal (EP
Report). 162 Compared to the European Commission’s December 2012
proposal, there are quite some differences. The EP suggests over 60
amendments to the Commission’s proposal, not all that important, but there
are several that will certainly be debated in the near future.163 Four of these
suggested amendments are as follows:
(i) Substitute the name of “liquidator” to “insolvency
representative”.
This is the UNCITRAL approach, although the “representative” aspect
triggers the question: representing the debtor? The creditors? A mixed bag
of interests?164
161. Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v. Christianapol Sp. z o.o.,
http://curiaeuropa.eu (2012).
162. Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744,
available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/0360(CO
D) [hereinafter EP Final Report]. For the Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs, see Draft
Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744,
available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=COM(2012)07
44 [hereinafter EP Draft Report]. See also The Opinion of the European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC) on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)—A New European Approach
to Business Failure and Insolvency, COM (2012) 742 final, available at
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.25551; Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency
Regulation, supra note 3. The EESC Opinion does not contain recommendations on the topic of
an “as if” undertaking.
163. See EP Final Report, supra note 162.
164. Id. amend. 3. As explained, the term “liquidator” covers a broad concept. In the Dutch text
of the Insolvency Regulation the word “liquidator” in Article 2(b) has been translated as
“curator”, which, under the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, refers to the person in charge of the
bankruptcy liquidation proceeding (faillissement). The “curator” in the Dutch text of the
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(ii) Remove out-of-court procedures from the definition of
collective insolvency proceedings (InsReg Art. 1). For England this
would mean that for instance proceedings in which an administrator is
appointed out of court or a company voluntary arrangement are outside the
definition’s scope.165
(iii) Prevent forum shopping by introducing a minimum three-
month period before the opening of main proceedings for a debtor to
establish its COMI. 166 A three-month looking-back period is also
introduced to determine the existence of an “establishment.”167
(iv) Introduce a new class of proceedings for groups for companies
(“group coordination proceedings”). These proceedings can be opened in
any Member State where a member company, performing “crucial
functions” within the group, has its COMI.168
In its Explanatory Statement, the EP still hold valid its observation that
“there are certain areas of insolvency law where harmonization is
worthwhile and achievable” 169 and that it cannot be neglected that
“disparities between national insolvency laws create competitive
advantages or disadvantages and difficulties for companies with cross-
border activities which could become obstacles to a successful restructuring
of insolvent companies.”170 It welcomes the Commission’s suggestions on
secondary proceedings, but suggests some changes and additions:
In addition, the draft report also formulates minimum criteria an
undertaking given by an insolvency representative to local creditors needs
to fulfil in order to be enforceable and binding. It also clarifies that any
decision to postpone or refuse the opening of secondary proceedings can
be challenged by local creditors. Last but not least, the draft report also
addresses the important question of what happens if the insolvency
Regulation also includes the administrator (bewindvoerder) in Dutch proceedings concerning
reorganisation (surseance van betaling) and the natural person’s debt discharge
(schuldsaneringsregeling natuurlijke personen). The broad definition of “curator” may therefore
create uncertainty in terms of its use in the Netherlands. The same could be said for Germany
(Verwalter) and the United Kingdom (liquidator), but not for France, where the word “syndic” (a
term currently employed in Article 2(b) to refer to any person acting in a national insolvency
proceeding, although it does not appear in Annex C) is used. The disadvantage of using
“insolvency representative” is that—in a Dutch context—it reopens a debate of several decades on
the question whether the appointed insolvency office holders represents the creditors or the debtor.
S/he represents nobody, s/he performs impartially a legal task taking into account the interests of
the creditors but in certain circumstances also other interests, such as employment.
165. Id. amend. 4. In England the European Parliament’s amendments have received a critical
reception. See, e.g., Chris Laughton, The European Insolvency Regulation: Amendment Proposals
from the European Commission and the European Parliament—What Next?, 55 EUROFENIX 20
(2014).
166. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 27.
167. Id. amend. 21.
168. Id. amend. 60.
169. Id. Explanatory Statement.
170. Id. at 47.
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representative is not complying with the undertaking. In such a case the
local creditors should have the right to seek protection via a court order for
instance by prohibiting removal from assets (Art. 29a (2b)).171
The EP’s considerations have resulted in an amendment of Recital 19a,
which relates to the EP’s amendment of Article 18 in the proposal, and
Recital 19b, which relates to the EP’s amendment of Article 29a in the
proposal. On February 5, 2014, the final text was adopted.172 The EP’s
proposal, laid down in the resolution, will now be subject to discussions
between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. With European
elections in May and new politicians replacing the existing Commissioners
during the period of revising the proofs (October 2014), there should be no
surprise that the next step will not be taken in 2014 anymore. As indicated
above, the EP also introduces additional requirements for the undertaking a
liquidator can make to avoid opening secondary insolvency proceedings in
other Member States, including the possibility of appointing in that latter
state a “trustee,” with restricted powers, to ensure that the main liquidator
will duly perform the undertaking.
These amendments are, in the Final Report EP, presented in the
following way (see Table 1):
Table 1.
Recital 19a
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment by EP
(19a) Secondary proceedings
may also hamper the efficient
administration of the estate.
Therefore, the court opening
secondary proceedings should be
able, on request of the liquidator,
to postpone or refuse the opening
if these proceedings are not
necessary to protect the interests
of local creditors. This should
notably be the case if the
liquidator, by an undertaking
binding on the estate, agrees to
treat local creditors as if secondary
proceedings had been opened and
(19a) Secondary proceedings
may also hamper the efficient
administration of the estate.
Therefore, the court opening
secondary proceedings should be
able, on request of the insolvency
representative, to postpone or
refuse the opening if these
proceedings are not necessary to
protect the interests of local
creditors. This should notably be
the case if the insolvency
representative, by an undertaking
binding on the estate, agrees to
treat local creditors as if
171. Id.
172. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 5 February 2014 on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No
1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744. The resolution was backed by 580
votes; 69 MEPs disagreed (19 abstentions).
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to apply the rules of ranking of the
Member State where the opening
of secondary proceedings has been
requested when distributing the
assets located in that Member
State. This Regulation should
confer on the liquidator the
possibility to give such
undertakings.
secondary proceedings had been
opened and to apply the rules of
ranking of the Member State
where the opening of secondary
proceedings has been requested
when distributing the assets
located in that Member State.
This Regulation should confer on
the insolvency representative the
possibility to give such
undertakings and to lay down
objective criteria which such
undertakings need to meet.
See justification for Article 18.
Recital 19b
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment by EP
(19b) In order to ensure an
effective protection of local
interests, the liquidator of the main
proceedings should not be able to
realise or re-locate the assets
situated in the Member State
where an establishment is located
in an abusive manner, in
particular, with the purpose of
frustrating the possibility that such
interests be effectively satisfied if
afterwards secondary proceedings
were opened.
(19b) In order to ensure an
effective protection of local
interests, the insolvency
representative of the main
proceedings should not be able to
realise or re-locate the assets
situated in the Member State
where an establishment is located
in an abusive manner, in
particular, with the purpose of
frustrating the possibility that
such interests be effectively
satisfied if afterwards secondary
proceedings were opened. Local
creditors should also be entitled
to seek protective measures from
a court in cases where an
insolvency representative
appears to be unable to honour
the undertakings.
See justification for Article 29a.
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I leave aside the recommendation of the EP to rename the “liquidator.”
On the matter of the “undertaking” that can be given by the liquidator in the
main insolvency proceedings, the amendments suggested for the text of the
Regulation by the EP are the most far-reaching (see Table 2).
Table 2.
Article 18(1)
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment by the EP
1. The liquidator appointed by a
court which has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 3(1) may
exercise all the powers conferred on
him by the law of the State of the
opening of proceedings in another
Member State, as long as no other
insolvency proceedings have been
opened there nor any preservation
measure to the contrary has been
taken there further to a request for
the opening of insolvency
proceedings in that State. Subject to
Articles 5 and 7, he may in
particular remove the debtor’s
assets from the territory of the
Member State in which they are
situated. He may also give the
undertaking that the distribution and
priority rights which local creditors
would have had if secondary
proceedings had been opened will
be respected in the main
proceedings. Such an undertaking
shall be subject to the form
requirements, if any, of the State of
the opening of the main proceedings
and shall be enforceable and
binding on the estate.”
1. The insolvency
representative appointed by a court
which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 3(1) or, in the case of a
debtor in possession proceedings
in accordance with that
jurisdiction, either the insolvency
representative or the debtor may
exercise all the powers conferred
on him by the law of the State of
the opening of proceedings in
another Member State, as long as
no other insolvency proceedings
have been opened there nor any
preservation measure to the
contrary has been taken there
further to a request for the opening
of insolvency proceedings in that
State. Subject to Articles 5 and 7,
he may in particular remove the
debtor’s assets from the territory of
the Member State in which they
are situated. He may also give an
enforceable and binding
undertaking that the distribution
and priority rights which local
creditors would have had if
secondary proceedings had been
opened will be respected in the
main proceedings. Such an
undertaking shall specify the
factual assumptions upon which it
is based, in particular with respect
to the distribution of local claims
over the priority and ranking
system under the law governing
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the secondary proceedings, the
value of distributable assets within
the secondary proceedings, the
options available to realise such
value, the proportion of creditors
in the main proceedings
participating in the secondary
proceedings and the costs that
would have to be incurred by the
opening of secondary proceedings.
Requirements concerning the form
which the undertaking is to take, if
any, shall be laid down by the laws
of the State of the opening of the
main proceedings.”
The Regulation itself shall lay down the minimum criteria an undertaking needs to
fulfil in order to not only serve legal clarity but also provide minimum protection to
local creditors.
In Article 29 (“Right to request the opening of proceedings”) several
changes have been suggested with the view on secondary proceedings (see
Table 3 and Table 4).
Table 3.
Article 29(a)(2)
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment by the EP
2. Upon request by the
liquidator in the main proceedings,
the court referred to in paragraph 1
shall postpone the decision of
opening or refuse to open
secondary proceedings if the
opening of such proceedings is not
necessary to protect the interests of
local creditors, in particular, when
the liquidator in the main
proceedings has given the
undertaking referred to in Article
18(1) and complies with its terms.
2. Upon request by the
insolvency representative in the
main proceedings, the court
referred to in paragraph 1 shall
postpone the decision of opening or
refuse to open secondary
proceedings if the insolvency
representative in the main
proceedings provides sufficient
evidence that the opening of such
proceedings is not necessary to
protect the interests of local
creditors, in particular, when the
insolvency representative in the
main proceedings has given the
undertaking referred to in Article
18(1) and complies with its terms.
Clarification with regard to burden of proof.
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The EP suggests three paragraphs in addition to Article 29a, as
proposed in the Commission’s proposal:
2a. Local creditors shall have the right to challenge the decision to
postpone or to refuse the opening of secondary proceedings within three
weeks of the decision having been made available to the public under
point (a) of Article 20a.
2b. Local creditors shall have the right to petition the court conducting the
main proceedings to require the insolvency representative in the main
proceedings to take suitable measures necessary to protect the interests of
the local creditors. Such requirement may include a prohibition against a
removal of assets from the Member State in which the opening of
secondary proceedings has been postponed or refused, a postponement of
the distribution of proceeds in the main proceedings or an obligation on
the insolvency representative in the main proceedings to provide security
for the performance of the undertakings.
2c. The court referred to in paragraph 1 (i.e. the court that has jurisdiction
to open secondary proceedings) may appoint a trustee whose powers are
restricted. The trustee shall ensure that the undertaking is duly performed
and shall participate in its implementation if this is necessary for the
protection of the interests of local creditors. The trustee shall have the
right to petition in accordance with paragraph 2b.173
Finally the EP suggests amending Article 29a(4) (see Table 4).
Table 4.
Article 29a(4)
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment by the EP
4. The liquidator in the main
proceedings shall be notified of the
decision to open secondary
proceedings and shall have the right
to challenge that decision.”
4. The insolvency
representative in the main
proceedings shall be immediately
notified of the decision to open
secondary proceedings and shall
have the right to challenge that
decision within three weeks after
receipt of that notification. In
justified cases the court opening
secondary proceedings may shorten
that period to not less than one
week after receipt of the
notification.”
In order to ensure legal certainty a time limit is introduced.
173. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 44–46.
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VII. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF AN “AS IF” UNDERTAKING
The provided text in the proposal of the European Commission and the
amendments suggested by the European Parliament fall—if I understand
correctly—into two categories: (i) queries and remarks regarding the draft
text (to the constituent (or lacking) elements of an “as if” undertaking); and
(ii) queries about the law applicable in such “as if” undertakings (matters of
conflict of laws).174 For the latter subject, see Part VIII.
Below I will first pose a few questions related to the first category,
leaving aside for the moment a discussion about the premise of “synthetic
secondaries.”175
A. “AS IF” UNDERTAKING INARTICLE 18
The EP suggests for Article 18(1) that the insolvency representative
(liquidator) may “also give an enforceable and binding undertaking that the
distribution and priority rights which local creditors would have had if
secondary proceedings had been opened will be respected in the main
proceedings.” 176 The word “also” serves to add a “Union” power of
substantial nature to the “domestic” powers a main liquidator may exercise
beyond the Member State within which he is appointed. The place in the
provision is therefore not very logical.
In the EP’s proposal it may be questioned, but in the Commission’s text
the answer is clear: the undertaking shall be enforceable and binding on the
estate.177
B. LEGAL NATURE OF AN “AS IF” UNDERTAKING;WHO ARE “LOCAL
CREDITORS”?
On first sight, an “as if” undertaking can be regarded as a unilateral
promise. Article 18(1) in both text-versions are, however, silent on the
question of to whom the addressed party of such a promise is. Logically,
given its nature and context, the addressees of the undertaking are “local
creditors” in another Member State. But, who are they? There is no
definition of “local.” InsReg Article 32 provides that any creditor may
lodge his claim in the main and in any secondary proceedings. Will “local
creditors” include creditors of claims already lodged in the main
proceedings (seemingly Westbrook’s first objection) or for instance, should
these creditors be creditors having their COMI outside the Member State
where the main proceedings have been opened? I suggest to include a
174. EP Final Report, supra note 162.
175. I am leaving aside also the broader context of such an undertaking, e.g., will it function in
those cases in which in the secondary Member State the majority of the assets is located (example:
main proceedings opened against a holding company in Member State A, possibility of opening
secondary proceedings in Member State B where the largest subsidiary is located)?
176. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 35 (emphasis omitted).
177. Id.
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localization rule, probably to add to the list of definitions in Article 2(g).
For instance, a “local creditor” in the meaning of Article 18(1) is the holder
of a claim, able to prove that if secondary proceedings would have been
opened in the other Member State, he would have a distribution or priority
right, etc. Another possibility would be to use the concept from InsReg
Article 3(4), so that a “local creditor” is a creditor “who has his domicile,
habitual residence or registered office in the Member State within the
territory of which the establishment is situated, or whose claim arises from
the operation of that establishment.”178
C. CONTENTS OF THE “AS IF” UNDERTAKING
The undertaking relates to “the distribution and priority rights which
local creditors would have had if secondary proceedings had been
opened.”179 These “rights” are to be determined by the lex concursus of the
Member State where fictionally secondary proceedings are not opened.
Regarding new Recital 19a, the Commission proposes,
Secondary proceedings may also hamper the efficient administration of
the estate. Therefore, the court opening secondary proceedings should be
able, on request of the liquidator, to postpone or refuse the opening if
these proceedings are not necessary to protect the interests of local
creditors. This should notably be the case if the liquidator, by an
undertaking binding on the estate, agrees to treat local creditors as if
secondary proceedings had been opened and to apply the rules of ranking
of the Member State where the opening of secondary proceedings has
been requested when distributing the assets located in that Member State.
This Regulation should confer on the liquidator the possibility to give such
undertakings.180
Applying that Member State’s “rules of ranking” may not lead to the
same outcome in cases where there may be two or more Member States that
could have opened secondary proceedings, whilst it is unclear whether
terms like “distribution,” “priority rights,” or “ranking” should be
178. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(4) provides:
4. Territorial insolvency proceedings referred to in paragraph 2 may be opened prior to
the opening of main insolvency proceedings in accordance with paragraph 1 only:
(a) where insolvency proceedings under paragraph 1 cannot be opened because of the
conditions laid down by the law of the Member State within the territory of which the
centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated; or
(b) where the opening of territorial insolvency proceedings is requested by a creditor
who has his domicile, habitual residence or registered office in the Member State within
the territory of which the establishment is situated, or whose claim arises from the
operation of that establishment.
179. EP Final Report, supra note 162, art. 18(1).
180. Id. recital 19a.
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interpreted on the basis of the lex concursus of the main proceedings or the
lex concursus secundary.
D. RIGHTS TO BE RESPECTED IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS
These “rights”—so the text in both versions—“will be respected in the
main proceedings.”181 In simpler terms, it is possible that an employee in
another Member State is much better off than an employee in the main
proceedings. This result may be tolerable to a certain extent, but it may be
regarded as against the imputation-rule of InsReg Article 20(2) or the
enforcements of a judgment of this nature may be regarded as manifestly
contrary to a Member State’s public policy (InsReg Article 26). For that
reason, I suggest that words to the effect that in such a situation paritas
creditorum/equal treatment is not breached, should be included.
E.MINIMUM CRITERIA OF AN “AS IF” UNDERTAKING
The EP sets—in its own words—minimum criteria for an undertaking.
It shall specify:
(i) the factual assumptions upon which it is based, in particular with
respect to the distribution of local claims over the priority and ranking
system under the law governing the secondary proceedings; (ii) the value
of distributable assets within the secondary proceedings; (iii) the options
available to realize such value; (iv) the proportion of creditors in the main
proceedings participating in the secondary proceedings; and (v) the costs
that would have to be incurred by the opening of secondary
proceedings.182
In as far as these specified criteria are mandatory (“shall”), it is
uncertain what the consequences will be when one or more of these criteria
are not, or just vaguely, taken into account. In addition, it may be the case
that under certain circumstances other facts may be of relevance too, such
as the rescue of a debtor with cross-border operations, the additional value
such a rescue may have as the total enterprise can be sold (without
disturbing secondary proceedings) to a third party, and the value the rescue
would have for maintaining employment and operational activities forming
a base for corporate tax in the other Member State.
The criteria mentioned differ in nature: the assumptions may be formed
in a shorter period, while the valuation will take time. In practice, all these
situations will differ, and therefore, it calls for a more flexible rule in which
the undertaking contains the sufficient information for a reasonable local
creditor to be able to decide to accept the offer made, or similar words,
181. Id. art. 18(1).
182. Id. amend. 35.
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seems to suffice. What has now been presented by the EP in the text could
be worded in a recital.
F. A “NOWORSE OFF” RULE IN AN “AS IF” UNDERTAKING?
Enhanced net value of assets available for distributions in the main
proceedings and the “as if” proceeding invokes the idea of creditor
protection, in which, at minimum, local creditors will be treated no worse
than creditors in the main proceedings.
G. A CONDITIONAL “AS IF” UNDERTAKING?
If the unilateral promise should lead to an acceptance by local creditors,
several questions arise. Is the main liquidator allowed to include conditions
to its undertaking? For instance, my undertaking should be accepted by
80% of the local creditors, or, my undertaking is ready for acceptance only
when third-party X offers an amount of $Y for all or certain described
assets. In this area, it is also important to assess whether the main liquidator
only makes the undertaking once, or whether he is allowed—when the
initial undertaking is rejected—to present a second or third undertaking.
The latter creates the danger of “undertaking shopping,” or bargaining.
Honest dealing suggests the undertaking should be unconditional and made
for a period of x days (e.g., five working days), without the possibility of
revocation.183
H. AGREEMENT BY THE LOCAL CREDITORS; HOLD OUT CREDITORS?
Because there is no rule on how to treat hold out creditors, “getting-to-
yes” ends up a cumbersome negotiation process that is complicated, time-
consuming, costly, and ultimately against the goal of efficient
administration of a debtor’s estate. Professor Fletcher and I have suggested,
in our June 2012 Global Principles Report,184 an efficacious rule—albeit
one that involves an element of steamrollering over principles of due
process—in Global Principles 36 (Plan Binding on Participant) and Global
Principles 37 (Plan Binding: Personal Jurisdiction):
36.1. If a Plan of Reorganization is adopted in a main proceeding pending
in a court with international jurisdiction with respect to the debtor . . . and
there is no parallel proceeding pending with respect to the debtor, the Plan
should be final and binding upon the debtor and the creditors who
participate in the main proceeding.
183. For form requirements, see infra Part VII.I.
184. TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES , supra note 130.
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36.2. For this purpose, participation includes (i) filing a claim; (ii) voting
on the Plan; or (iii) accepting a distribution of money or property under
the Plan.
37. If a Plan of Reorganization is adopted in a main proceeding in a court
with international jurisdiction with respect to the debtor. . . and there is no
parallel proceeding pending with respect to the debtor, the Plan should be
final and binding upon an unsecured creditor who received adequate
individual notice and over whom the court has jurisdiction in ordinary
commercial matters under the local law.185
I. FORM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE “AS IF” UNDERTAKING
The EP recommends that “requirements concerning the form which the
undertaking is to take, if any, shall be laid down by the laws of the State of
the opening of the main proceedings.”186 The recommendation results in 27
different systems of form requirements, as it may be the case that main
insolvency proceedings for instance could take place in the UK, but they
also can be opened in Croatia, Italy or Belgium. The “undertaking” is a
“Union” power and the form requirements should not be ‘national’ (in the
form and the language requirements of the four member States mentioned),
but should be harmonized in a European set of rules, which evidently also a
benefits local creditors.
In suggesting “European” rules, I propose: (i) the undertaking should be
in writing; (ii) the undertaking should be in English as well as in the
language of jurisdiction of the secondary proceeding; (iii) “known”
creditors should be informed by individual notice; 187 and (iv) the
undertaking should be published in a “European” register and/or a register
in the other Member State. 188 More consideration is due regarding the
question of whether registration, as noted in (iv), binds the hold out
creditors or creditors that are silent, either deliberately or because the
undertaking has not reached them. I suggest “European” rules would take
the text of Global Principles 36 and 37 (mentioned above) into account.
J. APPOINTMENT OF A LOCAL TRUSTEE
The EP indicates that the court that has jurisdiction to open secondary
proceedings may appoint a trustee.189 This “synthetic” trustee is a hybrid
185. Id. at 151. The underlying rationale is the UK provision for binding dissenting or non-
responding creditors, including unknown creditors under a CVA. See Insolvency Act, 1986, §
5(2)(b) (Eng.). A decision approving a CVA taken in accordance with § 4A “binds every person
who in accordance with the rules (i) was entitled to vote at that meeting (whether or not he was
present or represented at it), or (ii) would have been so entitled if he had had notice of it, as if he
were a party to the voluntary arrangement.” Id. § 4A.
186. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 35.
187. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 40(1).
188. See id. art. 21(1).
189. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 46.
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beast. The court may appoint such a trustee—but its discretion seems broad,
as there is no indication of what circumstances would warrant an
appointment. Which person is to be appointed? There is no Annex D, listing
trustees with their national names. This is obvious, as such a ‘trustee’ is a
new concept, but the Commission’s proposal does not provide for such an
Annex D. Therefore, under the present proposals, a trustee can be anyone
unlike a liquidator, whose appointment is restricted as listed in Annex C.
The trustee has the job to “control” the due performance of the main
liquidator’s undertaking. Where automatic recognition of insolvency
judgments by Member States’ courts is based on mutual trust, 190 there
seems to be suspicion towards the performance of a “Union” power by the
main liquidator. The task of the trustee is, to “ensure that the undertaking is
duly performed and shall participate in its implementation if this is
necessary for the protection of the interests of local creditors.” 191 It is
unclear which reasons led to the suggested amendment. Is the main
liquidator mistrusted? Or is it generally the weak way in which liquidators
are professionally and ethically regulated, as seen in some Member States
with limited of even absent rules? And if “secondary” jurisdictions are
reluctant to trust the main liquidator, is appointing a trustee the best
solution?
In cross-border cases, it is rather standard that the main liquidator
retains local counsel to assist him. Decisive here are the knowledge of the
local procedural rules and the local language. I am not aware of a study
related to the way “local” creditors have assessed the requirement of local
assistance with filing claims, such as through the main liquidator’s local
lawyer. The trustee does seem to be acting in the interest of local creditors.
Will they be asked by the court whether they feel it necessary to appoint a
trustee? Who will bear the costs? The appointment itself is at the court’s
discretion. It seems obvious to assume that the court will take into
account—when weighing against the cost of having a fully empowered
main liquidator involved at the local level—the contents of the undertaking
and the explanations given by the main liquidator as well as the delay and
costs of a trustee.192
Proposed Recital 20 expresses the following: “In their cooperation,
liquidators and courts should take into account best practices for
cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases as set out in principles and
guidelines on communication and cooperation adopted by European and
190. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, recital 22 (“Recognition of judgments delivered
by the courts of the Member States should be based on the principle of mutual trust . . . .”).
191. EP Final Report, supra note 162, amend. 46.
192. This additional layer of non-judicial supervision not only adds costs and complexity, but
flies in the face of the principle that all insolvency office holders act in the interests of all the
debtor’s creditors. See Laughton, supra note 165, at 23.
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international associations active in the area of insolvency law.”193 It fits in
the system of the present proposal to widen the guidance by best practices
to support a reasonable, impartial and independent exercise of the power to
give an undertaking by best practices which have their focus on
professional/ethical rules for the liquidator, such as the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development’s Insolvency Office Holder Principles.194
VIII. THE LAW APPLICABLE
As indicated previously, the second group of legal matters are related to
issues of conflict of laws, queries about the law applicable to such “as if”
undertakings. I will—very briefly—set out the EU system for determining
applicable law in cross-border legal matters.
Since December 17, 2009, the European Union has two regulations in
force on the subject of determining the law applicable to contractual
obligations and to non-contractual obligations (Rome I and Rome II).195
Rome I applies “in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual
obligations in civil and commercial matters.”196 However, in Article 1(2) of
Rome I, some ten matters are excluded from its scope, including:
(a) questions involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons;…
(e) arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court;… (g) the
question whether an agent is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a
company or other body corporate or unincorporated, in relation to a third
party;… [or] (i) obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion
of a contract…197
At first glance, it seems that legal disputes concerning an “as if’
undertaking given prior to the acceptance by (local) creditors is outside the
scope of Rome I. Article 12 of Rome I set out the scope of the law
applicable.198
193. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, recital 20.
194. Or the Insolvency Office Holders’ principles and best practices, presently being drafted by
Leiden Law School and discussed within INSOL Europe, the largest insolvency practitioners
organization. See TURNAROUND, RESCUE, & INSOLVENCY LEIDEN, www.tri-leiden.eu.
195. Council Regulation 593/2008, On the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome
I), O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC) [hereinafter Rome I]; Council Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable
to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II].
196. Rome I, supra note 195, art. 1(1).
197. Id. art. 1(2).
198. Id. art. 12 (Scope of the Law Applicable) provides:
1. The law applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in
particular:
(a) interpretation; (b) performance; (c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the
court by its procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations,
including the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by rules of law; (d) the
various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions;
(e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.
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Rome I is based on the principle of freedom of choice.199 Parties to a
contract are to choose the governing law. It may be applied to only a part or
the whole of the contract. 200 Article 10 (Consent and material validity)
provides in paragraph 1 that “[t]he existence and validity of a contract, or of
any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern
it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.”201 Article 10(2)
of Rome I, however, says that
Nevertheless, a party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may
rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it
appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to
determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in
paragraph 1.202
Provided that all the parties agree, the applicable law may be changed at
any time. If the law chosen is that of a country other than that relating most
closely to the contract, the provisions of the latter law still need to be
respected. If the contract relates to one or more Member States, the
applicable law chosen, other than that of a Member State, must not
contradict the provisions of Union law.203
In the absence of a choice, specific rules exist which are determined by
the nature of the contract. Article 4(1) of Rome I provides that the law
governing the contract shall be determined as set out in eight rules.204
Primarily, the law will be determined as follows: “(a) a contract for the sale
of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has
his habitual residence; (b) a contract for the provision of services shall be
governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his
habitual residence . . . .”205
For contracts concerning immovable property, the law of the country
where the property is located is applied, except in the cases of temporary
and private tenancy, a maximum six consecutive months.206 In such cases,
the applicable law is that of the country of residence of the landlord. A sale
of goods by auction is subject to the law of the country of the auction.
There are two general back-up rules in Rome I, Article 4(3) and Article
4(4). Article 4(3) provides that “where it is clear from all the circumstances
2. In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event of
defective performance, regard shall be had to the law of the country in which
performance takes place.
199. Id. art. 3.
200. Id. art. 3(1).
201. Id. art. 10(1).
202. Id. art. 10(2).
203. Id. art. 3(4).
204. Id. art. 4(1).
205. Id. arts. 4(1)(a), (b).
206. Id. art. 4(1)(d).
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of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a
country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other
country shall apply.”207 The other one is Article 4(4): “Where the law
applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected.”208
Rome II applies in a situation “involving a conflict of laws, to non-
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.” 209 It is the
intention that Rome I and Rome II dovetail. Rome II shall not apply to “the
liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority
(acta iure imperii).” 210 “Claims arising out of acta iure imperii should
include claims against officials who act on behalf of the State and liability
for acts of public authorities, including liability of publicly appointed
office-holders. Therefore, these matters should be excluded from the scope
of this Regulation.”211 A query therefore is whether this exclusion applies to
the main liquidator and the “synthetic” trustee if these are to be regarded as
“public officers.”
Rome II Article 4(1) provides the general rule that unless otherwise
provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in
which the damage occurs irrespective of (i) the country in which the event
giving rise to the damage occurred; and irrespective of the country or
countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. For cases
in which certain exchange of information between the main liquidator and
“local” creditors and/or the “synthetic” trustee can be expected, as it is also
possible that the undertaking will be subject of further negotiations. Under
European jurisdictions the question might arise that expectations have been
raised, leading to a reliance by a third perty, but that nevertheless the
contract is not concluded. In that case, Rome II Article 12 (Culpa in
contrahendo) may apply. It provides:
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether the
contract was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that applies to the
contract or that would have been applicable to it had it been entered into.
2. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of
paragraph 1, it shall be:
(a) the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irrespective of the
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and
207. Id. art. 4(3).
208. Id. art. 4(4).
209. Rome II, supra note 195, art. 1(1).
210. Id.
211. Id. recital 9.
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irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences
of that event occurred; or
(b) where the parties have their habitual residence in the same country at
the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs, the law of that
country; or
(c) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the non-
contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a
contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than
that indicated in points (a) and (b), the law of that other country.212
In the recitals to Rome II it is stated:
(29) Provision should be made for special rules where damage is caused
by an act other than a tort/delict, such as unjust enrichment, negotiorum
gestio and culpa in contrahendo.
(30) Culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an
autonomous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within the
meaning of national law. It should include the violation of the duty of
disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations. Article 12
covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct link with the
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. This means that if, while a
contract is being negotiated, a person suffers personal injury, Article 4 or
other relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply.
(31) To respect the principle of party autonomy and to enhance legal
certainty, the parties should be allowed to make a choice as to the law
applicable to a non-contractual obligation. This choice should be
expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the circumstances
of the case. Where establishing the existence of the agreement, the court
has to respect the intentions of the parties. Protection should be given to
weaker parties by imposing certain conditions on the choice.213
Not only Rome I and Rome II may have their influence. They are both
influential pieces of regulation on the substance of the law. Other regulation
may have their influence in matters of procedure. Which court will have
jurisdiction to decide a certain legal dispute related to the given “as if’
undertaking? Will it be the court in charge of the main insolvency
proceedings, the court in the secondary jurisdiction, or the court based on
the rules of the Brussels I Regulation? The present division in these matters
is that “actions which derive directly from those [main insolvency]
proceedings and which are closely connected to them” will be heard and
212. Id. art. 12.
213. Id. recitals 29–31.
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determined by the court having jurisdiction based on the EU Insolvency
Regulation.214
It follows from the above summarized, the present European system on
private international law (or: conflicts-of-law) does not suit well on the “as
if” undertaking. The insolvency office holder giving the undertaking may
be, in its domestic system, either a “private” or a “public” officer, the legal
nature of the undertaking itself may be regarded as “private” or “public”.
Under certain circumstances Rome I may apply, in slightly different
circumstances certain matters will be qualified as falling under the scope of
Rome II. It goes without saying that the myriad of rules creates
uncertainties and is not a system that is conducive to rescue and insolvency
matters, which require timely action, efficiency, and few unnecessary costs.
For this reason, I submit that the proposal to amend the EU Regulation
should create its own rules for the law applicable for an “as if” undertaking
and should exclude this figure from the scope of both Rome I as well as
Rome II.
When creating rules for an “as if” undertaking, it is tempting to choose
as a starting point the lex concursus, or the law of the Member State in
which the main insolvency proceeding is opened, as the liquidator
appointed in such a proceeding conduct the undertaking (Article 18 of the
Proposal, as cited above). The undertaking should be seen as an
“autonomous” legal concept, and the law applicable to related matters
should be a mix of legal rules that support the legal expectations of
creditors in another Member State. To supplement these rules guaranteeing
the effective performance of the undertaking, any disputes between the
liquidator, the addressee of an “as if” undertaking, or a third party claiming
an interest in the case disputes should in principle be decided by the court
of the Member State where secondary proceedings were opened without the
presence of an “as if” undertaking.
CONCLUSION
In this article, a new mechanism to be included in the EU Insolvency
Regulation is analyzed. It was proposed by the European Commission on
December 12, 2012 as part of a general amendment to the European
Insolvency Regulation. The proposal provides that the insolvency office
holder (or liquidator), appointed in the main insolvency proceedings “may
also give the undertaking that the distribution and priority rights which local
creditors would have had if secondary proceedings had been opened will be
respected in the main proceedings. Such an undertaking shall be subject to
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the form requirements, if any, of the State of the opening of the main
proceedings and shall be enforceable and binding on the estate.”215 In this
article, this mechanism also is referred to as an “as if” undertaking. The
words “as if” express that the undertaking treats its addressees, creditors
located in another Member State, “as if” secondary insolvency proceedings
had been opened when in fact these proceedings have not. The concept is
also know in American legal literature as “synthetic secondary
proceedings.” It has been the subject of recent debate by Professors Janger,
Westbrook, and Pottow, but the article has demonstrated that the idea has
its origin in German literature, dating over fifteen years ago.
Having generally explained the system of the European Insolvency
Regulation, now twelve years in legal force, I discussed the powers held by
a liquidator appointed in main insolvency proceedings, including their
effects outside the Member State where these proceedings are pending. The
fundamental foundation of the EU Insolvency Regulation is provided in
InsReg Articles 31(1) and (2)—the coordination of main insolvency
proceedings and secondary insolvency proceedings in which the liquidator
in the main proceedings and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings
are duty bound to communicate information to each other and to cooperate
with each other. On the other hand, InsReg Article 31(3) reflects the
dominant role of the main proceedings: the liquidator in the secondary
proceedings shall give the liquidator in the main proceedings an early
opportunity of submitting proposals on the liquidation or use of the assets in
the secondary proceedings. The nature and function of secondary
insolvency proceedings was explained in Part III with a focus on the
coordination of main insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency
proceedings, and clarified aspects of the so-called “dominant” role of the
main insolvency proceedings. Part IV gave a short overview of cross-border
insolvency court practice in Europe, which serves as the cradle on the
European Commission’s proposal regarding the “as if” undertaking by a
main liquidator. In Part V, stressed the Court of Justice of the European
Union’s emphasis on cross-border cooperation and indicates an answer on
the question of how to combine and align main and secondary proceedings,
which have different or even contrasting aims. After describing the core of
the European Commission’s proposals from December 2012 to amend the
EU Insolvency Regulation, along with the additional amendments by the
European Parliament (EP) in February 2014, I critically analyze the so
called “as if” undertaking. The remarks made relate to the draft text of
proposed Article 18 as well as to the question which is the law applicable if
such an “as if” undertakings takes place.
To clarify the “as if” undertaking under InsReg Article 18 (as proposed)
a distinction should be made between powers a main liquidator derives
215. See Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 3, art. 18(1).
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from its own national legal system and those which have their basis in the
Insolvency Regulation. The “as if” undertaking has the latter basis and
therefore, the legal figure must be interpreted autonomously, unrelated to
the main proceeding. Suggestions are made to solve the question of who the
“local creditors” are, as the addressees of an “as if” undertaking; what the
contents of such an undertaking should be (and whether it should at least
contain minimum requirements, including a “no worse off” rule); and under
which circumstances “rights” of these local creditors will be respected in
the main proceedings. Other uncertainties in the proposal are touched upon,
such as how hold-out creditors should be treated. Here, the ALI-III Global
Principles 2012 can provide a solution. An additional question concerns
form requirements applicable to an “as if” undertaking. Contrary to what
the European Commission has suggested, I proposed to establish a set of
European form requirements.
Finally, the European Parliament’s suggestion that the court that has
jurisdiction to open secondary proceedings may appoint a trustee is
criticized. Furthermore, it is submitted that European rules on the law
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligation are inadequate to
deal with the “as if” undertaking. These rules leave too many uncertainties
and are not geared to the needs of rescue and insolvency matters which
require timely action, efficiency, and fewer costs. Regarding matters of
substantial Law I submit that the proposal to amend the EU Regulation
creates its own rules for the law applicable for an “as if” undertaking, for
which I made some suggestions. To avoid unnecessary uncertainties
regarding the scope of my submission, a change to exclude this figure from
the scope of both Rome I and Rome II should be made as well.216
216. On Thursday. December 4, 2014 in the European Union the Council of Justice Ministers
adopted a political agreement on the renewed text of the Insolvency Regulation which has been
agreed with the European Parliament. It is directly clear that the new Regulation is nearly twice
the size of Regulation 1346/2000, now with 83 recitals (coming from 33), and 91 articles (coming
from 47), including around 20 articles relating to group insolvencies. The “undertaking” analyzed
in this article has found its way to Article 36 (recast) (“Right to give an undertaking in order to
avoid secondary proceedings”), including eleven paragraphs (some of which address the concerns
expressed in my contribution). See for its text, http://bobwessels.nl/2014/12/2014-12-doc4-text-
new-eu-insolvency-regulation-available/.
